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SYMPOSIUM: PROBLEMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN THE UNITED STATES*
KENNETH E. VANLANDINGHAM*"
Although long governed by what is generally known as "Dillon's
Rule," American municipalities have always desired at least some meas-
ure of local autonomy. They are regarded legally as occupying a sub-
ordinate status within the state; and, as a rule, they derive their ex-
istence and all their powers from the state constitution and state legis-
lative enactments. In the absence of state constitutional provisions to
the contrary, they are subject wholly to state legislative control.' The
principal legal device employed by them to obtain some measure of
freedom from state control is generally known as "home rule." 2
* Much information in this article is derived from questionnaires sent during the fall
of 1965 to directors of state municipal leagues, and from correspondence since that time
with several of these officials, with directors of state legislative councils and reference
bureaus, and university professors of political science. The author wishes to thank
all those who cooperated by supplying information, both published and unpublished.
Responsibility, however, for all conclusions drawn, and for all errors are his own.
B* A.., MA. University of Kentucky, 1942, 1945; PhD. University of Illinois, 1950.
Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky.
1. DmLoit, COMMENTARmS ON =HE LAW OF Mu rcl'r L CoiwoRAnoNs, S 237 (5th ed.
1911); City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri River R.R., 24 Iowa 455 (1868).
2. Although for a long period, the term "home rule" was not specifically mentioned in
constitutional provisions, it is now expressly stated in the provisions of Florida, Louisiana,
Minnesota, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Tennessee. For various
definitions of home rule, see p. 279 infra, The Meaning of Home Rule. Along with sig-
nificant articles which appear from time to time in legal and political journals, some of
the principal studies of home rule include: GooDnxow, Mu mctPA HOME RuLE (1895);
McBAw, TBE LAw Am t PRAancE OF MUICIPAL Hovm RuLE (1916); McGozRica, THE
LAW AN m PRACTICE OF MumcIPAL HOME RULE, 1916-1930 (1933); Mort, HomE
RuLE FOR AmEicA's CrnIEs (1949); CmcAGo HOME RuLE CoA'ir, MODERNIZING A
Crr, GovmuMmr (1954); Rusco, MuNIcPAL HOME RuLE: Guminuas FOR IDAiO (1960).
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Home rule, which was first constitutionally authorized by Missouri
in 1875,' has been said to be the logical outgrowth of constitutional
prohibitions on special legislation for cities,4 the most prevalent form
of state legislative treatment of many of them until late in the nine-
teenth century.5 Sometimes it is justified because of the impracticality,
save in certain necessary instances, of general legislation, and because
of the general failure of legislative classification. 6
HOME RULE CONSIDERED
Arguments For
Although no concrete evidence can be produced to measure pre-
cisely the value of home rule, various theoretical arguments can be
advanced in its favor.7 First, to the extent that municipalities will adopt
and exercise home rule powers, the state legislature and governor will
have more time to devote to matters of state-wide importance. Follow-
ing World War II, Maryland adopted home rule because local requests
for legislation placed too great a burden on its state legislature." Second,
home rule not only should decrease state meddling and interference in
the internal affairs of cities, but also should lessen log-rolling or legis-
lative trading common in the enactment of much local legislation. Third,
it should allow municipalities to initiate immediate action to resolve
their peculiarly local problems without waiting for state legislative au-
thorization. This advantage possesses greatest significance in states with
biennial legislative sessions.9 Fourth, it is sometimes believed that home
rule cities possess more potential powers than non-home rule cities. The
3. Mo. CoNsT. art. IX, § 20 (1875).
4. KNEaIE, CITY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNIrE STATES 86 (3rd ed. 1957).
5. Except for Texas (1912), constitutional home rule came late to the South and to
New England, areas where special legislation has remained most prevalent. Louisiana
(City and Parish of Baton Rouge, 1946) and Rhode Island (1951) were the first states
in these regions to adopt it. Under certain circumstances, special legislation is still
permitted in some home rule states. See, e.g., N.Y. CONSr. art. IX, § 2b(2); MINN.
CoNsr. art. XI, § 2; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
6. Concerning municipal experience with classification, see ADRIAN & PRESs, GOVERNING
URBAN AMERICA 168-169 (3rd ed. 1968); A. MACDONALD, American City Government
and Administration 54-56 (6th ed. 1955).
7. Cf. MAcDoNALD, supra note 6, at 67-69; Note, Home Rule and the New York
Constitution, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1145-1146 (1966).
8. Letter from George M. Dyer III, Field Representative, Maryland Municipal League,
to Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Oct. 11, 1965.
9. As of 1966, twenty state legislatures met in the annual session. COUNCIL OF STATE
GovERNmENTs, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 41 (1966-67).
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Supreme Court of Alaska, for instance, has commented that Juneau
"acquired greater legislative power upon becoming a home rule city." 10
Actually, however, there is reason to doubt whether the Alaska courtes
assertion is valid for most home rule cities. McBain's observation that
non-home rule cities do not suffer from any lack of powers, but suffer
rather from restrictions on the manner in which powers granted may
be exercised probably remains correct. 1
Moreover, in the realm of local taxation, an area some students of
state and local government consider vital to the existence of home rule,
only in California,' 2 and to some extent in Kansas, 13 do home rule cities
enjoy wide authority.14 In most states, constitutional restrictions on
local taxation preceded adoption of home rule provisions, and authors
of such provisions have been reluctant to include in them the power of
taxation. In some instances, evidently to allay voter resistance due to
fear of increased taxation, constitutional home rule provisions have ex-
pressly restricted or prohibited enlargement of local taxing authority.
The recent Massachusetts provision states: "Nothing in this article shall
be deemed to grant any city or town the power.., to levy, assess, and
collect taxes. . . ." 15 One reason for voter rejection in 1966 of the
draft Kentucky Constitution was the rather widespread belief that, if
adopted, this constitution would enlarge the taxing powers of units
of local government. Fifth, home rule may possess some psychological
advantage in that it can foster a sense of civic responsibility in local
citizenry. Last, inasmuch as municipalities usually acquire the legislation
they consider necessary, it may be worthwhile in the first instance to
grant them home rule. Home rule is in accordance with American
tradition, since historically Americans have strongly believed, and still
10. Juneau v. Hixon, 373 P. 2d 743, 749 (Alaska 1962).
11. McBaNr, supra note 2, at 111.
12. For California home rule cities, taxation repeatedly has been held a municipal
affair, and such cities, save as limited by the state constitution and their charters, possess
broad taxing authority. E.g., City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 308 P. 2d 1
(1957); City of Grass Valley v. Waltinshaw, 34 Cal. 2d 595, 212 P. 2d 894 (1949).
13. The Kansas provision [art. XII, § 5 (b)] empowers cities to levy taxes, excises,
fees, charges, and other exactions subject to the right of the state legislature to impose
limitations and prohibitions. Following adoption of this provision, the legislature acted.
See, KANq. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-1948-1953 (Supp. 1965).
14. In the absence of constitutional and statutory restrictions, home rule taxing
powers under some imperio in imperium provisions sometimes are judicially upheld.
See, e.g., Angell v. City of Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 NE. 2d 250 (1950); Barrett v.
State, 44 Ariz. 270, 36 P. 2d 260 (1934).
15. MAss. CoNsT. art. 11, § 7 (Supp. 1966).
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believe, in the idea of local self-government. 6 Although its fruits some-
times may be difficult to assess, in general, it has had a salutory influence
on municipal government. 17
Arguments Against
Although arguments in favor of home rule appear very persuasive,
certain facts concerning its desirability and feasibility should be noted.'8
First, due to the complexity of modern civilization, state government
has a primary interest in most governmental functions and very little
home rule may be possible. On the other hand, some facets of munic-
ipal government, such as its administrative organization and related
matters in the procedural area, and public planning and municipal own-
ership of utilities in the substantive area, remain local. " Moreover, munic-
ipal government retains, along with state government, a concurrent
interest in most governmental functions, including such major functions
as highways, health and welfare, and education.20 Although the scope
of home rule has undoubtedly narrowed, some home rule does remain
possible, and some home rule, however little, is preferable to none.
Although the "dogma of local self-government" strongly persists, few,
if any, municipal governments are fully capable of financing perform-
ance of their current governmental operations. 2' Still, the fact should
be recalled that no unit of government in the United States, save the
national government, which itself is heavily indebted, is wholly self-
16. Perhaps the case for the inherent right of local self-government has been most
strongly stated judicially, by Judge Cooley in People v. Hurlburt, 24 Mich. 44 (1871).
Although the Cooley doctrine has been followed in isolated instances by the courts of
Indiana, Kentucky, Iowa, and Florida, it has never enjoyed wide acceptance. See
ALDERFER, AMRIcN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION, 143-144 (1956).
17. "Home rule has not meant unfettered local self-government, but it has given the
city [New York] a little more freedom from state influence than the city might other-
wise enjoy." SAYRE AND KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEw YORK CrrY: PoLiTcs rN T-m
METROPOLIS 586 (1965).
18. Cf. Note, Home Rule and the N e'w York Constitution, 66 CoLuM. L. REV. 1145,
1146 (1966); KNEIER, supra note 4, at 83-86; MACDONALD, supra note 6, at 69-72.
19. Concerning classification of state and municipal functions, see 2 McQuir.rN, Tas
LAW OF MuNIcIPAL CORPORATzoNs, §5 4.85-4.100 (3rd ed., Supp. 1967); REED, MuNIcIPAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 148-149 (Rev. ed. 1934); AIDEaREa, supra note 16,
at 138-140; MACDONALD, supra note 6, at 71.
20. Legal recognition of municipal interest in these latter functions constitutes a
very challenging aspect of state-municipal relations. See p. 304 infra, The Old NML
Model Considered: Suggested Changes.




supporting financially. As already noted, in most states home rule or-
dinarily does not confer taxing authority, and the view does exist that
granting of home rule without at the same time delegating adequate
home rule taxing powers represents an empty and futile gesture.2 Such
taxing authority can, of course, be conferred, but since taxation in-
volves vast and serious economic consequences, the grant should, it
seems, be accompanied by stringent state regulation and supervision.
Finally, it is sometimes believed that home rule will be abused and
eventually will lead to "home ruin." Although the collective wisdom
of many city councils is probably inferior to that of most state legisla-
tures, there exists no evidence to support the view that inhabitants of
modem cities are incapable of self-government, or that city governments
are havens of corruption and inefficiency. Save for Chicago, home rule
presently exists in most heavily populated American cities, and the
governments of these cities with all of their tremendous problems are,
on the whole, generally well-administered and free of major corrup-
tion.23 Corrupt government can occur in any city, whether home rule
or non-home rule, and the only sufficient guarantee against its occur-
rence is an alert citizenry possessing considerable political intelligence.
LEGISLATIvE HOME RULE
Hoine rule can be, and sometimes is, conferred by legislation, but
most authorities when ,referring to it intend the constitutional variety,
which is the kind primarily considered in this article. Although difficult
to define, legislative home rule may be said to exist when the state legis-
lanre, in the absence of constitutional provision, empowers municipali-
ties to adopt and exercise home rule powers.24 Presently, it is authorized
in Virginia,25 New Jersey,26 Mississippi,2 7 Florida s2 North Carolina,21
22. Cf. CMCAGo HomE RuLE CoM''N, supra note 2, at 315.
23. See BANFmLD, BIG CITY POLTCS 11 (1965).
24. This definition may very properly be questioned. In Virginia, which is widely
regarded as a legislative home rule state, charters drafted locally are enacted by the
state legislature, and in Vermont and Delaware charters and charter amendments
initiated locally become effective unless disapproved by the state legislature. In New-
Jersey, on the other hand, exercise of home rule powers is subject to judicial review.
25. VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 117; VA. CODE ANN. H5 15.1-833-837; 15.1-910-915 (Supp.
1966).
26. NJ. STAT. ANN., H 40: 69A-29-30 (Supp. 1966).
27. Miss. CODE ANN, H 3374-109-111 (1942). Mississippi is now a general law state,
but it has twenty-three municipalities functioning under special charters granted prior
to adoption of general law. Letter from C.N. Fortenberry, Department of Political
Science, University of Mississippi, to Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, May 18, 1967.
1968]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Wisconsin (except Milwaukee), 3° Delaware, 31 Vermont,32 New Mexi-
co,a3 and Kentucky (Louisville);4 but only in Virginia, New Jersey,
Delaware, and perhaps to some extent in Wisconsin, where constitu-
tional home rule is also authorized, does it really have practical sig-
niicance.
Acting under a 1920 constitutional amendment,35 which empowers
it to grant any city or town, upon request, special form of organization
and government, the Virginia legislature has authorized local drafting
of municipal charters or charter amendments which in turn require state
legislative approval. Approval comes by way of legislative enactment
of the local proposal for legislation which the state legislature may
amend."' The uniqueness of the Virginia system lies in the fact that it
permits the legislature to grant, by special act, charters tailored to fit
the peculiar needs of individual cities.17 As of January, 1968, thirty-
seven Virginia cities were reported as having special charters granted
or approved by the state legislature.3 8
Although the New Jersey Constitution contains no home rule pro-
vision as such, it does authorize a form of "negative home rule," since
it empowers municipalities or counties to request state legislative enact-
ment of special legislation, which becomes effective only upon local
approval.39 In 1950, the New Jersey legislature enacted the "Optional
Municipal Charter Law," popularly known as the Faulkner Act, under
which a municipality may select an optional form of government. Any
28. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 166.01-166.15 (1965).
29. GEN. STAT. OF N.C. ch. 160, §§ 353-363 (1964).
30. Wis. STAT. AN. §§ 61.34 (1), 62.11 (5) (Supp. 1967). In Wisconsin, legislative
home rule is in practice apparently as successful or more successful than constitutional
home rule. See Hagensick, Wisconsin Home Rule, 50 NAT. MUN. REV. 349, 351-353
(1961).
31. DEa.. CODE ANN. tit. 22, §§ 801-836 (Supp. 1966).
32. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 702 (a) (1967). In Vermont, municipal home rule may
have only limited significance, inasmuch as the town, governed by general law, is the
principal unit of local government. Only three or four towns have charters. ABA,
LoCAL GOVERNMENT LAW SEvRcIE LETTER 54 (Supp. Dec. 1963).
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-14-1-14 (Supp. 1967).
34, Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 83.011-83.012 (1966).
35. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 117.
36. VA. CODE ANNt. §§ 15.1-833-837; 15.1-910-915 (Supp. 1966).
37. Concerning legislative consideration and enactment of municipal charters in Vir-
ginia, see Bohannon, Local Bills-Some Observations, 42 VA. L. REV. 845 (1956).
38. Letter from Harold Baumes, Executive Secretary, Va. Municipal League, to Ken-
neth E. Vanlandingham, Jan. 23, 1968.
39. N.J. CosrT. art. IV, § 7, 10.
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municipality which exercises this option thereby acquires the right to
exercise what appears to be rather extensive home rule powers, which,
by terms of the state constitution and state law, are to be accorded
liberal judicial interpretation.40 As of 1964, thirty-six municipalities had
elected to adopt an optional form of government and to exercise home
rule powers.41 In 1961, Delaware enacted legislation which included
the stipulation that any city desiring to adopt home rule should adopt
it within the following nvo years; and eleven cities elected to do so.42
In 1963, by empowering all cities to amend their charters, Vermont also
authorized legislative home rule.43
Although older than constitutional home rule, legislative home rule
is frequently viewed, sometimes unjustly, with considerable prejudice
and skepticism. 4 Professor Bromage, for instance, has said that "legis-
lative home rule is at best a slendor reed for municipal charter-making
and local self-government." 41 There are several reasons for this antipathy.
In some instances, it has been held unconstitutional as an unlawful dele-
gation to cities of the state legislative power,46 but in other instances
its constitutionality has been upheld.47 In any event, it rests upon a
40. NJ. CONsr. art. IV, § 7, 11; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:69A-29-30.
41. NEw JERSEY TAXPAYER'S AssocIATIoN, Nnw JERSEY'S OPTIONAL MUNICIPAL CHAR-
TE LAW 3 (1964).
42. See DFi. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 836 (Supp. 1966). As of 1967, two cities had adopted
completely revised charters, while others had made minor charter revisions. No charter
amendments submitted for state legislative approval have been disapproved. Letter
from Maurice Hartnetr I1, Exec. Director, Delaware Legislative Reference Bureau, to
Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, June 12, 1967.
43. Supra note 32.
44. Iowa adopted legislative home rule in 1851, IoWA CODE OF 1851, ch. 42.
45. Bromage, The Home Rule Puzzle, 46 NAT. Mui. Rav. 118, 119 (1957).
46. See Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E. 2d 723 (1953); Elliott v. City of
Detroit, 121 Mich. 611, 84 N.W. 820 (1899); State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149
Wis. 488, 137 N.W. 20 (1912). The New York Court of Appeals has stated that, prior
to adoption of the 1923 home rule amendment, legislative home rule would have been
unconstitutional in New York State because it would have usurped legislative authority
vested in the state legislature by the state constitution. See Matter of Mooney v. Cohen,
272 N.Y. 33, 4 N.E. 2d 73 (1936).
47. See State ex rel. Brown v. Emerson, 126 Fla. 576, 171 So. 663 (1935); Yazoo City
v. Lightcap, 82 Miss. 148, 33 So. 949 (1903); Bucino v. Malone, 12 N.J. 330, 96 A. 2d
669 (1953). Following adoption of constitutional home rule, legislative home rule was
judicially upheld in Wisconsin. Hack v. City of Mineral Point, 203 Wis. 215, 233 N.W.
82 (1930). The author believes that a broad general grant of legislative home rule
accompanied by an enumeration of specific powers and functions falling within the
grant might be judicially upheld. At least it can be argued that, by refining the grant
in some measure, the enumeration would narrow the scope of legislative authoriy dele-
gated.
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precarious basis until its constitutionality has been finally determined.
In 1957, Connecticut adopted legislative home rule, but later adopted
constitutional home rule (1965), fearing that legislative home rule might
be held unconstitutional. 4  The Delaware home rule provision requires
state legislative approval of municipal charters and charter amendments.
Local home rule action is considered legally effective unless disapproved
within the first thirty calendar days of a legislative session by a tvo-
thirds vote of all the members elected to each house of the state legis-
lature.49 In Vermont, legislative home rule functions are very similar to
those of Delaware. There, municipal charter amendments, if submitted
to the state legislature within sixty days preceding adjournment, become
effective at the end of the legislative session unless disapproved or
amended. " Since in Delaware and Vermont legislative home rule is
contingent upon state legislative approval, the question of constitu-
tionality of legislative delegation of power is perhaps satisfied.5 '
In addition to the question of constitutionality, other objections are
sometimes voiced against legislative home rule. Since the home rule
grant rests solely upon a legislative basis, it may be retracted by subse-
quent legislation. Moreover, where legislative home rule exists, the state
legislature has a tendency to ignore it by continuing to legislate in local
affairs. But these same objections can be brought against constitutional
home rule when the home rule provision authorizes the state legislature,
as it often does, to determine or define the home rule grant of powers.5 2
Indeed, it has been said that "[t] o the extent that the legislature retains
unlimited or virtually unlimited authority to supersede an exercise of
municipal initiative conferred by the constitution, there is only a seman-
48.See CONN. PUBLic Acr, No. 465 (1957); CoNN. CoNsr. art. X, S 1. See also MAss.
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT RELATIVE TO HoME RuLE 80-81 (Sen. Doc. No.
950, March, 1965).
49. DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 813 (c) (Supp. 1966). Doubt has been expressed to the
author whether members of the General Assembly or their staffs even read charter
amendments submitted. Letter from Maurice Hartnett III, Executive Director, Dela-
ware Legislative Reference Bureau, to Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, June 12, 1967.
50. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 702 (a). Since authorization of home rule, Vermont
municipalities are reported as having made charter changes each year, none of which
have been disapproved by the state legislature. Letter from George M. Blaesi, Executive
Director, Vermont Legislative Council, to Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Jan. 18, 1968.
51. Although the constitutionality of Delaware home rule has not been directly
challenged, it has apparently been upheld by implication. Dunn v. Mayor and Council
of City of Wilmington, 219 A. 2d 153 (Del. 1966).
52. Concerning constitutional provisions based on legislative supremacy, see p. 293
infra, Home Rule in Operation: Under Legislative Supremacy Provisions.
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tic difference between constitutional and legislative home rule, at least
when the latter is defined in broad terms." "' Further, it is sometimes
urged that since the legislature can revoke a legislative home rule grant
at any time, cities will hesitate to adopt it. Sometimes this belief is not
borne out by actual experience. Cities in the legislative home rule states
of New Jersey, Virginia, and Delaware apparently possess more home
rule than cities in such constitutional home rule states as Utah, Pennsyl-
vania, Nevada, Hawaii, and Wisconsin. 4 But due to the prejudice
against it, and due also to fact that most states already have adopted
constitutional home rule, very few states are likely to adopt legislative
home rule in the future. Moreover, the argument seems valid that if
home rule is to be adopted, the desire of cities for it should be suffi-
ciendy strong to warrant writing it into the state constitution. This is
not to say, however, that constitutional home rule will prove under all
circumstances more successful in practice than the legislative variety.
CONsTITUTIONAL HoME RULE ADOPTION
Although the scope of possible home rule powers has narrowed be-
cause of the increasing complexity of modem civilization,5 5 states and
municipalities have manifested a continuing interest in constitutional
home rule. Since the end of World War II, it has been adopted by
fourteen states, including the new states of Alaska and Hawaii. This
number exceeds by three the number of states which authorized it dur-
ing what might be called its formative period (1875-1912). 56 In 1966,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and North Dakota adopted amendments
bringing to thirty-three the number of states whose constitutions con-
tain home rule provisions of some sort.57 Most state constitutions au-
53. See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for
the Courts, 48 MiNN. L. REv. 643, 669, n. 102 (1964).
54. See p. 281 infra, Extent of Home Rule Adoption.
55. The thesis has been advanced that the more populous a city becomes, the greater
the likelihood its problems will become state in character. See David, Is Municipal Home
Rule a Dead Duck? TAx DiGmor 141, 151 (1959).
56. This number includes Florida (Dade County and municipalities therein), New
Mexico (combined city-counties with more than 50,000 population), and Maryland
(Baltimore was granted home rule in 1915).
57. ALsKs CONSr. art. X, 5§ 1, 9-11; Amz. CONSr. art. XIII, SS 2-3; CAr. CoNST. art.
XI, S 6 et seq. CoLo. CoNsT. art. XX, §5 1-6; CoNr. CoNsr. art. X, S 1; FLA. CoNsT. art.
VIII, 111; GA. CoNsr. art. XV; HAwAII CoNsr. art. VII, §5 1-5; KAN. CoNsr. art. XII,
§ 5; LA. CONsr. art. XIV, §5 3a, 22, 40; Mo. CONST. art. XI-A (Baltimore), art. XI-E;
MAss. CoNsT. art. of amend. II; MIcH. CoNsr. art. IV, 5 29, art. VII; MINN. CONST. art.
XI, 5 3-5; Mo. CoNsT. art. VI, §§ 19-20; NEB. CoNsr. art XI, §5 2-5; NEv. CoNsT. art.
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thorize adoption of home rule by all cities, but some limit adoption to
cities with certain populations. Colorado, Oklahoma, and West Virginia
limit adoption to cities above 2,000 population; California and Arizona
to cities above 3,500 population; Nebraska and Texas to cities above
5,000 population; Missouri, Washington, and Pennsylvania to cities
above 10,000 population; Alaska to first class cities (400 perma-
nent residents); New Mexico to combined city-counties above 50,000
population; and Florida to Dade County (Miami) only.
The fact that a state constitution contains a home rule provision does
not necessarily mean that home rule is available for immediate adoption,
inasmuch as adoption authorization itself usually depends on the nature
or wording of the provision. Home rule provisions are generally clas-
sified as self-executing, mandatory, and permissive.5 A self-executing
provision, such as that of Colorado, enables a city to adopt and exercise
home rule powers immediately without the necessity of state imple-
menting legislation. A mandatory provision, sometimes termed a non-
self-executing provision, such as that of North Dakota, stipulates that
the state legislature "shall" enact implementing legislation to provide
for home rule adoption. A permissive provision, such as that of Geor-
gia, New Hampshire, or Hawaii, merely authorizes home rule and
empowers the state legislatures to grant it at its discretion.59 Generally
the self-executing type of provision is much preferred to the mandatory
or permissive type, because under it the legislature cannot delay or
wholly prevent home rule adoption. It has been said that "[1] egislative
disinclination to act has no practical cure in 'mandatory' states and none
at all in 'permissive' states." 60 Usually, state legislatures act in good
VIII, § 8; N.H. CONST. Part I, Bill of Rights (art. 39); N. MEX. CoNsr. art. X, § 4;
N.Y. CONsT. art. IX, §§ 1-3; N. DAK. CoNsT. § 130; Omo CONST. art. XVIII; OKLA. CoNsr.
art. XVIII, §§ 2-7; ORE. CoNST. art. XI, §§ 2, 2a; PA. CoNST. art. IX, § 2; R.I. CONST. amend.
XXVIII; S. DAIC. CoNsT. art. X; TENN. CoNsT. art. XI, § 9; TEXAS CourT. art. XI, § 5;
UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5; WASH. CoNST. art. XI, §§ 10-11; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39a;
Wis. CONsT. art. XI, § 3.
58 Cf. PHILLIPS, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN AMRICA 66-67
(1960).
59. The permissive type of provision removes all constitutional objections to the
state legislature's authority to delegate home rule power to cities. Further, its usual
brevity may overcome political objections found in some states to lengthy constitutional
provisions; and with a legislature sympathetic to home rule, it can prove satisfactory.
60. KESTETER, Municipal Home Rule, MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 256, 257 (1956). As
a remedy for state legislative refusal to provide charter-adoption procedure under the
mandatory type of provision, the National League of Cities, formerly the American
Municipal Association, has proposed that such procedure be prescribed by the local
[Vol. 10:269
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faith in authorizing home rule adoption, but after adoption of a pro-
vision in 1922, the Pennsylvania legislature waited twenty-seven years
before acting, and then it authorized home rule only for Philadelphia.0
Following adoption of a provision in 1954, the Georgia legislature waited
eleven years before authorizing cities to adopt home rule. Moreover,
although Nevada adopted a permissive amendment in 1924, its legisla-
ture still has not authorized home rule adoption. Hawaii's permissive
amendment authorizes home rule for all political subdivisions, but the
legislature has authorized adoption only by counties. Therefore in the
event the state legislature is likely to be unsympathetic toward home
rule, a state writing a new constitution would be well-advised to include
a self-executing provision.
62
THE MEANING OF HOME RULE
It is very difficult to formulate a precise definition of home rule,
inasmuch as there exists no unanimity of agreement among authorities
concerning its meaning.6 3 In a sense, the term represents a metaphor
which excites strong emotions and with some truth Thomas H. Reed
has called it a "state of mind." 64 McBain defined it as the application
of the federal principle to the state-local relationship.65 Viewed this
way, it may be considered a device f6r allocating powers and func-
tions between the state and its municipalities. It may also be considered
legislative body; and, in the event this latter agency refuses to act, it suggests forcing
action through judicial notice upon petition. AmEsaucAN MuNrciPaL ASSOCIATION (Na-
tional League of Cities), SUGGESTED CoNsTITUnoNrAL PROVISIONS FOR HOVrE RULa § 4
(1953). Provisions based on the NLC proposal are now contained in the Alaska and
Pennsylvania constitutions. See ALASKA CoNsT. art. X, § 9; PA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2. See
also infra note 61.
61.In April, 1968, Pennsylvania abandoned its former provision (art. XV, § 1)
by adopting a provision based largely on the NLC model. The new provision authorizes
any general-purpose unit of local government which adopts a charter to exercise any
power or perform any function not denied by the state constitution, by charter, or
by state law. It also contains a safeguard against state legislative refusal to provide
charter-adoption procedure. It stipulates that, in the event of state legislative inaction,
a charter or procedure for framing and adopting a charter may be submitted to the
electorate by the local governing body or by local vote initiative. PA. CoNsT. art. IX,
§ 2.
62.When the state legislature itself proposes an amendment, however, it may, of
course, choose to make it non-self-executing.
63. Various conceptions of home rule are discussed in CHICAGO HomE RULE COMx'N,
supra note 2, at 193-197.
64. See REm, supra note 19, at 133.
65. See McBAIN, supra note 2, at 109-110.
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both a legal and a political concept; legal in the sense that the allocation
of powers and functions rests upon law; and political in the sense that
it involves exercise of political judgment. Although recognizing that
it frequently fails to do so, one author has suggested that the aim of
constitutional home rule is to alter the constitutional position of cities
within the state, i.e., assure cities some powers independent of state
legislative control.66
Home rule does not mean, and has never been intended-to mean,
complete local autonomy within the state, because home rules cities
must always remain integral parts of state government and must assume,
like non-home rule cities, responsibility for enforcement of state law.
Further, state constitutions usually expressly restrict or prohibit alto-
gether municipal home rule authority in such state matters as municipal
incorporation, establishment of municipal territorial boundaries, defini-
tion of crimes, education, and taxation and indebtedness. 67 A recent
definition of home rule as "the autonomy of local government in the
sovereign state over all purely local matters" appears to express cor-
rectly the legal position of the home rule city.68
Ordinarily, a home rule grant transfers authority from the state
legislature to municipalities to enact measures of purely municipal con-
cern.69 Historically, home rule has been associated with the local charter-
making power, because in most instances, as a prerequisite to exercising
home rule powers, municipalities have been required to adopt charters
or "municipal constitutions" drafted by local charter commissions se-
lected according to terms prescribed by the state constitution or by
state law.70  But this requirement has not been universal inasmuch as
cities in New York, Wisconsin, and, to a large extent, Ohio, have been
permitted to exercise home rule powers without adopting charters.
Some comparatively recent home rule provisions, including those of
Maryland, Tennessee, Kansas, and Massachusetts, also permit direct
exercise of home rule powers. In some of these states, however, charter
66. Rusco, supra note 2, at 4.
67. For illustration of these restrictions, see N.Y. CoNsr. art. VIII, art. IX, § 3;
NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION, § 8.01 (6th ed. 1963).
68. MASSACHUSETTS LEMXLATivE RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 48, at 35.
69. Cf. Home Rule is the "complete or partial transfer of a portion of government
power from the state to the city." McGoLDiuct, supra note 2, at 2.
70. As an illustration of the association of the charter-making power with home
rule, Professor Bromage has defined home rule as the "authority of a city under a
state constitution and laws to draft and adopt a charter for its own government."
Bromage, The Home Rule Puzzle, 46 NAT. MuN. REV. 118 (1957).
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adoption in the traditional manner is authorized, and some cities have
adopted charters. But charters written and adopted in the traditional
fashion are unknown in New York, Wisconsin, and Kansas. In Ohio,
where the charter-making power is widely used, a non-chartered city
may exercise all home rule powers not in conflict with general laws.71
In Tennessee, where twelve cities have adopted charters, a city may
adopt home rule merely through a favorable referendum vote, and may
then function under its existing charter, which it may amend. The
recently adopted Massachusetts provision confers direct broad home
rule authority on all cities, and adoption there of a municipal charter
serves only to limit exercise of municipal powers.
Although McBain believed a city adopting home rule should begin
its home rule experience by writing an entirely new charter, thus re-
examining and recodifying all its municipal law, 2 there is much to
commend provisions which authorize direct exercises of home rule
powers. In most states, charter adoption procedure prescribed by the
state constitution involves a long drawn-out process; and for this ap-
parent reason, some cities may hesitate to adopt charters. It is therefore
probable that, if directly authorized, home rule powers, will be more
widely adopted and exercised.
ExrEr OF HOME RULE ADoPTiON
A mere enumeration of states whose constitutions contain home rule
provisions reveals little concerning the existence and practice of home
rule. In some states it is not constitutionally authorized for all cities,
and in other states with permissive provisions the state legislature has
not enacted the necessary implementing legislation to make home rule
adoption possible. In some states, judicial decisions asserting state inter-
est in matters perhaps considered by some as municipal have discouraged
home rule initiative by narrowing the sphere within which home rule
powers may be exercised.73 Municipal initiative is also discouraged when
71. Following the 1923 decision in Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgeway, 108 Ohio
St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923), it was widely believed that non-chartered cities in Ohio
could exercise all home rule powers granted by the state constitution. But in a 1964
decision, Leavers v. City of Canton, I Ohio St. 2d 33, 203 NE. 2d 354 (1964), the
Ohio Supreme Court ruled that such cities could exercise only those powers which
are consistent with general law. For additional comment on the Ohio provision, see
text and notes 103-106 infra.
72. McBArN, supra note 2, at 617.
73. See Richland, Courts Nullify Home Rule, 44 NAT. MuN. REv. 565-570 (1955);
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charter provisions must be consistent with state law.74 Doubtless also,
numerous cities fail to adopt and exercise home rule powers out of sheer
apathy.75
Home rule charter adoption appears most widespread in the follow-
ing states: 76 Michigan, 211 cities and 51 villages; Texas, 175 cities; Ohio,
122 cities; Minnesota, 92 cities; California, 71 cities; Connecticut, 52
cities;77 Oklahoma, approximately 50 cities; and Colorado, 24 cities.
Although exact information is unavailable, during the past thirty years,
one hundred Oregon cities have adopted new or revised charters, mak-
ing Oregon one of the leading home rule states. Almost all cities incor-
porated there since 1906 have adopted charters and some cities incor-
porated prior to that time have adopted charters or made extensive
charter revisions.7 1 Missouri, the birthplace of constitutional home rule,
had ten home rule cities. Home rule is also widely practiced in Alaska,
with twelve of its fourteen first-class cities adopting it. Charter adop-
tion appears to have made least progress in Nebraska and Utah with only
two cities each, and in Hawaii, where only the City and County of
Honolulu has adopted it. New Mexico, where home rule is authorized
for combined city-counties with 50,000 or more population, has had no
charter adoptions.
As earlier noted, in a growing list of states, home rule provisions
authorize cities to exercise home rule powers directly without adopting
charters. Since most of these states have adopted such provisions only
within recent years, incomplete information exists concerning the extent
of their home rule activity. In New York, where, subject to state gen-
eral laws, municipalities are empowered to enact and amend local
Note, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 1145, 1148-1151
(1966); HAGENSICK, supra note 30, at 351.
74. In order to be assured of home rule powers, the cities of Lincoln and Omaha,
Nebraska have lobbied to have their charter provisions written into state law. See
A3.A., LOCAL GovwRNmVENT LAW SERvIcE LEr, 52 (Supp. 1963).
75. Concerning home rule apathy in Nebraska cities, see Winter, Home Rule Neg-
lected, 47 NAT. Mtru. Rav. 451-456 (1958).
76. Except as otherwise indicated, information contained in the remainder of this
section was obtained by replies received during the fall of 1965 to a questionnaire sent
primarily to state municipal leagues.
77. Includes revisions, some minor, to charters originally granted by special legislative
acts. Constitutional home rule, which in effect validated legislative home rule, was
adopted in 1965. CoNN. CoNsT. art. X, § 1.
78. Oregon has perhaps the briefest home rule provision of all states. It provides:
"The legal voters of every city and town are hereby granted power to enact and
amend their municipal charter, subject to the Constitution and criminal laws of the
State of Oregon . . . ." ORE. CoNST. art. XI, § 2.
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laws relating to their "property, affairs or government," adoption of
local laws is not widespread. In Wisconsin, where cities may exercise
home rule powers by exempting themselves from state statutes through
enactment of what are called "charter ordinances," home rule authority
also appears little exercised. No Wisconsin city has ever adopted a
completely new charter as home rule activity there has been confined
to charter amendments. During the first thirty years of home rule, 166
of Wisconsin's 550 cities and villages adopted 558 charter ordinances,
more than 250 of which were adopted by Milwaukee.79 In Kansas,
however, under a recently adopted home rule provision, cities appear
to be making reasonably wide use of their home rule authority. During
the period, July 1, 1961 to December 31, 1964, 127 cities enacted 197
"charter ordinances" (ordinances exempting them from provisions of
state statutes), and at least 115 cities enacted some 187 "ordinary or-
dinances" (ordinances initiating legislation).8°
Only after a considerable period of time has elapsed can these recent
provisions which authorize direct exercise of home rule authority be
fully evaluated. It would seem that, all other factors being equal, such
provisions would encourage home rule activity. In summary, it appears
that although constitutional home rule exists in name throughout much
of the United States, there are only a few states in which it is widely
practiced.
GENEsIs AND DEVELOPMENT OF HOME RULE THOUGHT
Most students of state and local government generally consider home
rule desirable, but they have never been able to determine satisfactorily
either what it should constitute, or what should be the most satisfactory
method for granting it. Although a proper home rule provision, i.e.,
a provision which grants broad home rule authority protected against
legislative and judicial encroachment," will not, in itself, guarantee
79. Hagensick, supra note 30, at 349.
80. DRURY, HomE RULE IN KANSAS 74, 76 (Univ. of Kan. Publications, Governmental
Research Series, No. 31, 1965). For additional comment on the Kansas provision, see
p. 302 & notes 163-164 infra.
81. Those who advocate adoption of provisions based on the model suggested by
the American Municipal Association, now the National League of Cities, in its study
MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HomE RULE (1953) are not likely to
agree with the author's definition of a "proper" provision. The NLC model leaves the
substantive area of home rule entirely to legislative control. Concerning it, see p. 299
infra, Model Hmne Rule Plans: The NLC Model. The model plan of the American
Municipal Association, now the National League of Cities, is hereafter referred to as
the "NLC model."
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municipal exercise of home rule powers, home rule surely cannot flour-
ish under provisions which discourage or inhibit its exercise. Under
such circumstances, experience demonstrates municipalities will display
very little home rule initiative. Undoubtedly, the home rule provision
must be considered a major factor determining exercise of home rule
powers. Indeed, it has been said that "the area of greatest possibility
of influencing the practical working of home [rule] ... is in the specific
wording of home rule provisions." 82 Unfortunately, throughout the
entire home rule period, many home rule provisions have been worded
in such language that home rule initiative has not been encouraged.
The Missouri Provision
It is not surprising that states first adopting home rule should have
been exceedingly cautious, as many have since been, to preserve state
legislative supremacy over cities. Indeed, in their desire to preserve
supremacy, authors of early home rule provisions phrased them in such
ambiguous language that home rule, where it did emerge, owes its origin
largely to favorable judicial interpretation. The first constitutional
provision, adopted by Missouri in 1875, authorized any city above
100,000 population (St. Louis) to "frame and adopt a charter for its
own government, consistent with and subject to the Constitution and
laws of the State," provided in addition that charters should always be
in harmony with and subject to the constitution and state law.' Further,
it stated that the state legislature should have the same power over the
City and County of St. Louis as it had over any other city.s4 Judged
by its phraseology, it is difficult to understand how this provision actually
granted home rule, because it would seem that its statement "consistent
with and subject to the Constitution and laws" alone would have nulli-
fied the grant of authority made to a city to "frame and adopt a charter
for its own government."
But, taking the view that those who authorized and those who ratified
the amendment intended cities to have some home rule, the Missouri
Supreme Court eventually held that only in matters involving state-
wide concern did charter provisions have to be consistent with and
subject to the constitution and laws. Charter provisions, involving mat-
ters of purely local concern were held to prevail over conflicting state
82. Rusco, supra note 2, at 44.
83. Mo. CoNsT. art. IX, 5§ 16, 23 (1875).
84. Id. S 25.
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laws. 5 Most other state supreme courts interpreting provisions similar
to Missouri's eventually reached the same conclusion.,6 The Missouri
provision is also significant because, as interpreted by the Missouri
Supreme Court, it created an area within which cities, freed entirely
from state control, could govern themselves. In setting apart an area,
however vague, within which the legislature could not intrude, it
created what Mr. Justice Brewer of the United States Supreme Court
was later to call an imperio in imperium.s7
The California Provision
In 1879, California adopted a provision granting the charter-making
power in language similar to that of the Missouri provision, but it in-
cluded the requirement that charter provisions should be subject to and
controlled by general laws. 8 Unlike the Missouri court, the California
Supreme Court interpreted this provision to mean that all charter pro-
visions, including those involving municipal affairs, were subordinate
to conflicting state general laws. 9 Before California cities obtained
meaningful home rule, its provision had to be amended to remove
municipal affairs from control by general laws.90
85. See, Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458, 41 S.W. 943 (1897); State ex rel.
Kansas City v. Field, 99 Mo. 352, 12 S.W. 802 (1889). Early decisions involving the
meaning of the Missouri provision are very conflicting, and only gradually did the
Missouri court adopt the imperio in imperium doctrine. See MAcDoNALD, supra note 6, at
60-62; McBAIN, supra note 2, at chaps. 2, 3; Dyson, Ridding Home Rule of the Local
Affairs Problem, 12 KAN. L. REv. 367, 369-370 (1964). The Missouri, California, and
Minnesota provisions are treated at some length in order to reveal the thought of this
important home rule period.
86. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, for instance, in interpreting the Oklahoma pro-
vision followed the reasoning of the Missouri Supreme Court. See Lackey v. State,
29 Okla. 255, 116 P. 913 (1911). See also Merrill, Constitutional Home Rule for Cities-
Oklahoma Version, 5 OEI:A. L. Rv. 139, 149-150 (1952).
87. St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893). For a compara-
tively recent assessment of Missouri home rule, see Schmandr, Municipal Home Rule in
Missouri, 1953 WAsH. UNIv. L. QUART. 385-412 (1953).
88. CAL. CONST. art. Xi, § 6 (1879). The Washington State provision of 1889 (art. XI,
§ 10), borrowed from the California provision, also subjected municipal charters to
control by general laws. The Washington provision remains basically unamended and
Washington home rule has been, and continues to be, a matter of legislative grace.
Concerning home rule in Washington State, see BuREAu OF GOvERNMENT RESEARCH AND
SERvIcEs, UmNv. OF WAsH., MUNIcIPA. GoVERNmENT IN Il STATE OF WASmNGrON 14-17
(1962). See also note 141 infra.
89. See, People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 435, 18 P. 413 (1888); Staube v. Election Com-
missioners, 61 Cal. 313 (1882). See also Jones, "Municipal Affairs" in the California Con-
stitution, 1 CAL. L. REv. 132-147 (1913).
90. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 6 (1896). The California provision, as amended, now pro-
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The Minnesota Provision
In its wording at least, the Minnesota provision of 1896,"' since
amended, was equally if not more emphatic than Missouri's in subject-
ing home rule to legislative control. After conferring the charter-
maling power in language similar to that of the Missouri provision,
it stated that before any city should incorporate, the legislature should
prescribe the general limits within which charters should be framed,
that charters should always be in harmony with and subject to the con-
stitution and laws, and that the legislature might provide general laws
relating to the affairs of cities, which should be paramount to the same
subject matter included in city charters. Because the Minnesota Su-
preme Court interpreted this provision literally,12 Minnesota home rule,
like home rule in many other states, has been a matter of mere state
legislative grace.9 8
Provisions Adopted Since 1912
Following adoption of the Minnesota provision and through the year
1912, all states adopting provisions, save Michigan and Texas whose
provisions emphasized legislative supremacy, adopted provisions based
on the Missouri or imperio in imperium model. The Colorado provision
of 1912 differed from other provisions of this era in that, in addition
vides: "Cities and towns hereafter organized under charters framed and adopted by
authority of this Constitution are hereby empowered . .. to make and enforce all laws
and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to the restrictions and
limitations provided in their several charters." The language of this provision con-
stitutes a limitation rather than a grant of power. California is generally re-
garded as one of the better home rule states. For recent comment on California home
rule see, WxcKwARE; NEw CotuNcILmE AND nm LAW OF MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATnoNs IN
CALIFORNIA (League of California Cities, May, 1964).
91. MiNN. CoNsr. art. IV, § 36 (1896).
92. See Western State Utilities Co. v. Waseca, 242 Minn. 302, 65 N.W. 2d 255 (1954);
State ex reL Dann v. Hutchinson, 206 Minn. 446, 288 N.W. 845 (1939).
93. This provision was amended on Nov. 4, 1958, to remove much of the restrictive
language subjecting charters to legislative control. It now reads: "Any city or village
. . . may adopt a home rule charter for its government in accordance with this con-
stitution and the laws." MINt. CoNsT. art. XI, § 3. Although there has been very little
case law interpreting it, this provision is still regarded as subjecting charters entirely
to state legislative control. See A.B.A. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW SERVICE LErER 53-54
(Supp. Dec., 1963). Since there appears very little difference between the language
of the current Minnesota provision and that of imperio in hnperiurn provisions of such
states as Missouri and Oklahoma, it now seems logical, at least to the author, for the




to giving cities a broad general grant of home rule authority in "local
and municipal matters," it enumerated several specific home rule pow-
ers.14 Unlike the Colorado provision, other provisions based on the
imperio in imperium model granted home rule in vague language, whose
meaning has been subject to judicial determination.
Although varying somewhat in language, most provisions adopted
since 1912 are based primarily on or emphasize legislative supremacy.
But because it reserves exclusively for municipalities the area of muni-
cipal affairs, the Utah provision of 1932, likely borrowed from Cali-
fornia, must be classified as imperio in imperium. 5 The Wisconsin home
rule provision of 1924, which empowers cities to determine their "local
affairs and government," 96 appears also to be based on the imperio in
imperium model, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court has ruled otherwise.
It has held that Wisconsin home rule enactments can be nullified through
state legislation applicable uniformally to all cities. 7 Although the New
York home rule provision of 1923, since amended, is sometimes con-
sidered to contain features of the imperio in imperium model, it is doubt-
ful whether this classification is wholly correct, inasmuch as powers
falling within its home rule grant in "property, affairs or government,"
as well as the additional specific home rule powers enumerated, must all
be exercised consistently with general laws.98
Provisions based on the legislative supremacy model usually consist
of two principal types: first, those which grant home rule within a
limited sphere, such as "property, affairs or government" subject to
control by general laws; and, second, those which make no specific
home rule grant, but rather leave determination of the quantity of home
rule to be authorized, often within a limited sphere, entirely to legisla-
tive discretion. As an illustration of the first type, the Louisiana pro-
vision of 1952 grants every municipality home rule within the area of
"local affairs, property and government" but provides also that the
94. CoLo. CoNsr. art. XX, § 6. Denver, however, was granted home rule in 1902.
95. UTAH CoNST. art. XI, S 5 (1932). The Utah provision, like the Colorado provision,
enumerates a few home rule powers and functions. Home rule has made but little
progress in Utah, with only two cities adopting it by 1965. Apparently, the principal
reason for adoption of home rule is to enable cities to change their form of govern-
ment. Letter from A. M. Ferro, Legal Consultant, Utah Municipal League, to Kenneth
E. Vanlandingham, Oct. 15, 1965.
96. See Wis. CoNsr. art. XI, § 3.
97. Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 25 (1936). For additional
comment on Wisconsin home rule, see p. 292 & notes 119-122, 158-161.
98. N.Y. CowST. art. IX, § 2b (2) (Supp. 1967).
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"Constitution and any general laws passed by the legislature shall be
paramount and no municipality shall exercise any power or authority
which is inconsistent or in conflict therewith." 91 The home rule pro-
vision of the Connecticut Constitution, adopted in 1965, illustrates the
second type. It provides that "[t] he General Assembly shall by general
law delegate such legislative authority as from time to time it deems
appropriate to towns, cities, and boroughs relative to the powers, or-
ganization, and form of government of such political subdivisions." 100
The current model home rule provisions of both the National League
of Cities and the National Municipal League, as well as provisions based
on them, may also be cited as examples of the legislative supremacy type
of provision.1°1 They differ from the traditional type of legislative
supremacy provision, however, in that they empower the state legisla-
ture to prohibit home rule action, not to grant it.
General Concluding Observations
Certain general observations should be made concerning the nature
of the various types of home rule provisions now existing. First, some
of them, and particularly those based on the imperio in imperium model,
are poorly phrased and drafted; seldom do they contain definitions to
clarify the meaning of expressions or terms they employ-the New
York provision is an exception'° 2-and extensive judicial interpretation
of them is frequently required. The Ohio provision, which grants the
charter-making and substantive powers in separate sections is perhaps
the worst of such provisions. 0 3 In a 1956 opinion, Chief Justice Wey-
99. LA. CoNsr. art. XIV, § 40(d).
100. CONN. CONST. art. X, 5 1.
101. In addition to enumerating home rule powers and functions, the home rule
provision contained in the fifth edition of the MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION makes a broad
general grant of home rule in imperio in imperiuvm fashion. See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL
LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION § 8.04 (5th ed. 1948). This model is hereafter re-
ferred to as the "old NML model." The present edition of the MODEL STATE CONsrTI-
TTxoN grants home rule powers and functions subject to legislative control. See NA-
TIONAL MuNIctPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CoNsTiTTON S 8.02 (6th ed. 1963). This
model is hereafter referred to as the "new NML model." However, it must be noted
that the 6th edition was revised in 1968.
102. See N.Y. CONsT. art. IX, § 3 (3d) (Supp. 1967).
103. Omo CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 provides: "Municipalities shall have authority to
exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their
limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict
with general laws." And § 7 of the same article states: "Any municipality may frame
and adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, subject to the provisions
of section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government."
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gandt of the Ohio Supreme Court noted that these sections "have been
highly and often bitterly controversial even from the time they were
first proposed." 104 In order to give meaning to the Ohio provision, the
state supreme court has been required to "read" into section three a
comma following the word "self-government" which its authors either
intentionally or unintentionally neglected to insert.105 Moreover, in a
1964 decision, the Ohio court ruled that, in the absence of charter
adoption, Ohio cities can no longer exercise home rule powers which
are inconsistent with general laws. 0
Second, most home rule provisions, and particularly those adopted
during recent years, emphasize state legislative supremacy. Although
a few provisions based on the imperio in imperium model have been
adopted during the past forty-five years, this type of provision belongs
largely to the home rule era ending in 1912. Frequently, in cases arising
under provisions of this character, state supreme courts have tended
to uphold state authority as against home rule prerogatives. Conse-
quently, authors of recent home rule provisions, evidently frustrated in
their efforts to draft satisfactory provisions based on the imperio in
imperium model, have usually devised provisions based on or emphasiz-
ing legislative supremacy. 07
Third, in addition to the fact that most amendments adopted through-
out the entire home rule period authorize legislative control of home
rule, it should also be noted that, in general, rather than showing
originality and inventiveness in drafting provisions, most states have
displayed a rather marked tendency to borrow from previously existing
or contemporary provisions. The Arizona provision is apparently bor-
rowed from the Oklahoma provision, the West Virginia provision from
the Michigan provision, the Louisiana provision from the New York
and California provisions, and the Kansas provision in part from the
Wisconsin provision. Several states, including Louisiana, Rhode Island,
Maryland, and Tennessee, have either borrowed verbatim or paraphrased
the home rule grant in "property, affairs or government" contained in
104. State ex rel. Lynch v. City of Cleveland, 164 Ohio St. 437, 132 N.E. 2d 118,
120 (1956).
105. See supra note 103; State ex rel. Petit v. Wagner, 170 Ohio St. 297, 164 N.E. 2d
574, 577 (1960).
106. Leavers v. City of Canton, 1 Ohio St. 2d 33, 203 N.E. 2d 354 (1964). See also
supra note 71.
107. Early provisions emphasized legislative supremacy; the imperio in imperium
doctrine is largely judicial in origin. See p. 286 & note 85 supra.
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the New York Constitution.' The California constitutional provision
which empowers "any county, city, town, or township to make and
enforce within its limits such local, police, sanitary, and other regula-
dons as are not in conflict with general laws" 109 has been either bor-
rowed verbatim or paraphrased in the constitutions of Washington,
Idaho, Ohio, Utah, and Louisiana. States currently adopting home rule
provisions display a tendency to borrow from the model provision of
the National League of Cities.
Finally, apparently for fear of opening a "Pandora's Box" through
judicial interpretation of new provisions, states are reluctant to alter
existing provisions radically even to improve them. For example, Michi-
gan and Missouri in adopting new constitutions, and New York and
Minnesota, in amending provisions, made few significant home rule
changes. Thus, at present, there exist among several states provisions
reflecting the thoughts of the various home rule periods.
HoME RULE IN OPERATION
Attainment of successful home rule under either imperio in imperium
or legislative supremacy provisions is frequently very difficult. Under
the former type of provision the principal difficulty is that of judicially
determining home rule powers, while under the latter, the main prob-
lem is that of securing sympathetic legislative treatment in the matter
of legislative delegation of adequate home rule authority. This state-
ment, and the general tenor of the discussion of this entire section,
should not be interpreted to imply that home rule under either type
of provision cannot be successful, or at least moderately successful in
practice, since it is generally regarded as reasonably satisfactory under
imperio in imperium provisions in California, Oregon and Ohio, and
under legislative supremacy provisions in Michigan and Texas. Al-
though the home rule provision is unquestionably an important factor
determining the success of home rule, other factors, such as a favorable
legislative and judicial climate and municipal willingness to exercise
home rule powers, are equally or perhaps more important. There is also
108. See note 98 supra.
109. CAL. CONST. art. Xl, § 11. Recently, the California Supreme Court has displayed
a tendency to hold that the state legislature has by implication pre-empted powers
granted by this section to units of local government. See In re Hubbard, 62 CAL. 2d
119, 396 P. 2d 809 (1964); In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P. 2d 897 (1962). See also




much truth in the statement that " . . there is no fool-proof home-rule
doctrine in the sense that you can set it up in a state constitution, walk
away, and forget it. Under all known systems, cities and villages must
be alert to what goes on and may happen at the state capital." 110 In
any event, for whatever the reason or reasons, home rule under both
types of provisions has proved successful in some states.
Under "Imperio in Imperium" Provisions
Save for a few provisions, such as those of Colorado and Utah which
enumerate some specific home rule powers along with making a broad
general grant of home rule authority, most provisions based on the
imperio in imperium model define the home rule grant in vague lan-
guage, such as "frame and adopt a charter for its own government"
(Mo.),"' "all powers of local self-government" (Ohio), 112 "municipal
affairs" (Cal.),"' "all local and municipal matters" (Colo.)," 4 "prop-
erty, affairs or government" (N.Y.), 1 r and "local affairs and govern-
ment" (Wis.). "  Under such provisions, determination of which
matters are state and which matters are local constitutes the crux of the
home rule problem. Such determination, however, is in most instances
exceedingly difficult. The Nebraska Supreme Court, for instance, has
confessed: "It is not easy in all cases to distinguish between municipal
powers and state powers, and when they come within the classification
of police powers, they are as impossible of accurate definition as the
police power itself." "7 Determination of home rule powers is some-
times further complicated by the fact that the character of governmental
functions changes. As noted by the California Court of Appeals: "The
term 'municipal affairs' is not a fixed quantity, but fluctuates with every
change in the conditions upon which it is to operate." 118 Local func-
tions for this reason are sometimes judicially reclassified as state; and
110. Bromage, Rededication to Municipal Home Rule, 40 MICH. MuN. REv. 4 (1967).
111. Mo. CONST. art. VI, 5 19.
112. OHIo CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
113. CAr. CONsr. art. XI, § 6.
114. COLO. CoNsr. art. XX, § 6.
115. N.Y. CoNsr. art. IX, § 2b(2) (Supp. 1967).
116. Wis. CoNsr. art. XI, § 3.
117. Consumers Coal Company v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 189 N.W. 643, 646
(1922).
118. Helmer v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 48 Cal. App. 140, 191 P.
1001 (1920).
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when reclassification occurs, the possible quantity of home rule is there-
by decreased.
When considering the meaning of the Wisconsin home-rule provision
which provides that "[c]ities and villages ... are hereby empowered
to determine their local affairs and government, subject only to this
constitution and to such enactments of the state legislature of state-
wide concern as shall with uniformity affect every city or every vil-
lage," 119 the Wisconsin Supreme Court commented that it could find
no answer to the question of when an enactment of the state legislature
is of state-wide concern "in any decision of any court in this coun-
try." 120 The Wisconsin court apparently resolved the problem, though
surely not satisfactorily from the viewpoint of home rule advocates, by
holding that, though not absolutely binding upon it, determination of
what is a local affair and what is a matter of state-wide concern belongs
in the first instance to the state legislature, for the reason that it involves
large considerations of public policy.'' As might be expected in de-
ciding cases involving conflicts between municipal ordinances and state
statutes, the Wisconsin court frequently holds in favor of the state.122
Although other state supreme courts do not expressly follow the Wis-
consin judicial policy in determining the character of governmental
functions, decisions reached by most of them in cases involving state-
municipal conflict are much the same as Wisconsin's decisions. Coupled
with the fact that local laws relating to "property, affairs or govern-
ment" must be consistent with general laws, judicial assertion of "state
interest" in numerous cases, some involving only a single city, has been
an important factor seriously weakening New York home rule. 28
Judicial assertion of "state interest" has also been a significant factor
eroding home rule in Rhode Island, whose 1951 provision is based
largely on New York's provision.124
119. Wis. CONsT. art. XI, § 3.
120. Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 25, 28 (1936).
121. id. 267 N.W. at 31.
122. Hagensick, supra note 30, at 350.
123. See, e.g., Salzman v. Impellitteri, 305 N.Y. 414, 113 N.E.2d 543 (1953); County
Securities, Inc. v. Seacord, 278 N.Y. 34, 15 N.E. 2d 179 (1938); Adler v. Deegan, 251
N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929). The draft NEw YoaR CoN TToTN, defeated in referen-
dum vote, November, 1967, would have abandoned the home rule provision of the
present constitution for one based on the NLC or new NML models. Concerning this
draft provision, see art. IX, § 2 (Supp. 1967). This constitution is contained in the
New York Times, Sept. 27, 1967.
124. See Newport Amusement Co. v. Maher, 92 R.I. 51, 166 A.2d 216 (1960); Opinion
to the House of Representatives, 80 R.I. 288, 96 A.2d 627 (1953). The draft Ruouz
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In deciding cases involving conflict between municipal ordinances and
state statutes, state supreme courts for several reasons frequently rule
in favor of the state. First, enactments of the state legislature, a body
coordinate with the state supreme court, are ordinarily presumed con-
stitutional.125 Second, determination of the character of governmental
functions is admittedly a very difficult task. Actually, the problem of
classifying these functions appears to have no satisfactory solution, since
in a complex society state and local governments frequently have a
concurrent interest in them, and they cannot be assigned to exclusive
spheres save on the basis of arbitrary reasoning. Finally, since the state
does have an interest in most functions, the judiciary usually allows it
to prevail. Most state supreme courts today apparently agree with the
statement of Justice Cordozo, made while a member of the New York
Court of Appeals, that "... . affairs, though concerns of a city, are sub-
ject none the less to regulation through the usual forms of legislation
if they are concerns also of the state." 126 Indeed, today, when a state
supreme court in a case involving municipal versus state interest rules
against the state and in favor of the municipality, its decision is usually
noteworthy.127
Under Legislative Supremacy Provisions
Michigan and Texas early adopted constitutional provisions subjecting
home rule to legislative control. 28 Throughout the entire home rule
period, and particularly during recent years, perhaps due to dissatisfac-
tion with provisions based on the imperio in imperium model, other
states have adopted provisions, which though different in language and
in approach, likewise subject home rule in varying degrees to such
control. Several states, including New York, Maryland, Massachusetts,
ISLAND CoNsTrrtrroN, defeated in referendum vote, April, 1968, would have abandoned
the home rule provision of the present constitution for one based on the NLC or new
NML models.
125. See, e.g., State v. Double Seven Corp., 70 Ariz. 287, 219 P. 2d 776 (1950);
Peterson v. Hancock, 155 Neb. 801, 54 N.W. 2d 85 (1952).
126. Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705, 713 (1929).
127. This may represent an overstatement, but, nevertheless, it contains a large
element of truth. See, e.g., State ex rel Henig v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Ore. 1115, 373
P. 2d 680 (1962), wherein the Oregon Supreme Court held civil service for municipal
firemen to be a local function. In its opinion, the Oregon court made clear that a
municipal ordinance involving a matter of local concern prevails over a state statute
applying uniformly to all cities. This case is noted in THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 72
(1963).
128. Micu. CONST. art. VII, § 21 (1908); TExAs CONST. art. XI, § 5 (1912).
19681
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Kansas, Louisiana, and Rhode Island, require local laws or city charters
to be consistent with general laws, such laws being applicable to all
or to particular classes of cities. The "consistency requirement" con-
tamed in these provisions thus enables a state legislature to prevent or
veto municipal exercise of home rule powers. In some states, including
New York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts and Kansas, based on the idea
that there is "safety in numbers," the legislative veto must apply uni-
formly to all cities, but in other states, it can apply to one or more
classes of cities, sometimes even to a single city in a class. When the
latter situation obtains, home rule can be nullified through special legis-
lation enacted under guise of classification. The National League of
Cities has proposed that, for classification purposes, the state legislature
group municipalities into not more than four classes, with at least two
in each class. 12 9 Although their classification schemes vary somewhat
from the NLC plan, its basic idea of preventing legislative discrimination
against the more populous cities has been incorporated into the consti-
tutions of Massachusetts and Florida (Dade County).130 The Louisiana
provision, applicable to New Orleans, also protects that city against
legislative descrimination by providing that legislation applicable to
fewer than five of the state's most populous cities, including New Or-
leans, may not become effective until approved by its voters.""'
Some states, including Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Hawaii, North
Dakota, and Georgia, have provisions which give the state legislature
discretion to determine the quantity of home rule to be delegated to
cities. This is true also of the Michigan and West Virginia provisions
which stipulate that charters shall be written "under general laws"
enacted by the state legislature. All of these provisions appear to repre-
sent scarcely more than constitutional authorization for the state legis-
lature to delegate its powers to cities. Under such provisions, the munic-
ipalities' freedom to determine their local affairs depends solely upon
legislative grace.1 2 According to one author such freedom is "com-
129. A,,RIcAN MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION (National League of Cities), SUGGESTED
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HoME RULE, S 3 (1953).
130. FLA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 11(6); MASS. CONsr., art. of amend., art. II, § 8 (Supp.
1967).
131. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 22 (1950).
132. Some directors of state municipal leagues replying to the. author's home rule
questionnaire assert that home rule under legislative supremacy provisions is not truly
home rule; and, indeed, it does seem paradoxical that constitutional provisions should
provide that home rule municipalities should derive their powers from, or have them
controlled by, acts of the legislature.
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parable to that of a cow staked out to graze by a chain which may be
lengthened or shortened at will." 133 Interestingly enough, however, if
measured merely by number of charter adoptions, home rule enjoys its
greatest success in states with such provisions. Michigan, the leading
home rule state in the number of charter adoptions, has had this kind
of provision for sixty years and has enjoyed reasonable, though perhaps
not spectacular, success with it. By giving its home rule cities a broad
range of permissive powers, and by usually refraining from enacting
laws violating home rule principles, the Michigan legislature has been
somewhat liberal in its treatment of municipalities. But these cities,
through their state municipal league, still must keep constantly on the
alert ito prevent erosion of home rule through enactment of state gen-
eral laws.' On the other hand, under a provision borrowed almost
verbatim from the Michigan provisions,135 West Virginia cities have
enjoyed very little success with home rule, for the reason that the state
legislature has granted home rule cities no significant powers not granted
non-home rule cities. The principal reason West Virginia cities have
adopted home rule is to enable them to adopt council-manager govern-
ment.'
30
Of all the older home rule states having the legislative supremacy
type of provision, Texas appears the most successful in making home
rule work. The success of home rule there apparently results largely
from a favorable legislative and judicial climate. The fact that Texas
home rule cities are not subject to classification for state legislative
purposes appears to be another factor responsible for its success.137
Although the Texas Supreme Court has ruled that home rules cities
derive their powers directly from the state constitution,' 38 almost im-
133. Merrill, supra note 86, at 149. In his statement, Professor Merrill was obviously
referring to the Oklahoma and other similar provisions, but his observation is applicable
to all legislative supremacy provisions.
134. For recent comment and observations on Michigan home rule, see Bromage,
Home Rule: The Strength of Local Governmnent in Michigan, 38 MICH. Mu. REv.
136-137 (1965); Rededication to Municipal Home Rule, 40 MicH. MUN. REv. 3-5 (1967).
135. IV. VA. CoNsT. art. VI, § 39(a).
136. Letter from Claude J. David, Director, Bureau for Government Research, West
Virginia University, to Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Nov. 24, 1967.
137. Inasmuch as the Texas home rule provision intends to place all cities above
5,000 population on an equal footing, classification of them for state legislative purposes
is precluded by implication. Letter from Riley E. Fletcher, General Counsel, Texas
Municipal League, to Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, June 23, 1967.
138. City of El Paso v. State ex rel. Town of Ascarate, 209 S.W. 2d 989 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947).
19681.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
mediately following adoption of home rule, the Texas legislature en-
acted legislation, since amended, giving the cities a broad grant of home
rule authority, and enumerating "for greater certainty" thirty-four
specific home rule powers.:' Apparently wherever possible, Texas
courts cite this statute to uphold municipal exercise of home rule powers;
but they show no reluctance to uphold exercise of other powers not
enumerated in it.'140 In general, these courts take the view that unless
the legislature has forbidden with unmistakable clarity the exercise of
a particular power, home rule cities may exercise it.""
In evaluating the legislative supremacy type of provision one must
note that it has enjoyed mixed success, apparently succeeding in some
states, though not in others. Perhaps to understand the reason for this
mixed success one needs to recall the observation of Thomas H. Reed
that home rule is a "state of mind." In other words, where home rule
of this kind has succeeded, conditions generally have been favorable to
it. Logically, two factors appear to enhance its chance of success: (1)
a requirement that state legislation negating home rule should be uni-
formly applicable to a large number of cities, including the more pop-
ulous ones; and (2) the existence of a strongly effective state municipal
league to lobby for home rule interests. Without such adequate safe-
guards, a state having a long history of undue legislative interference
in municipal affairs, such as Washington, might do well not to adopt
this kind of provision. 42
MODEL HOME RULE PLANS
Due primarily to the dynamic nature of American society-altering
139. See VERNON'S ANN. Tax. Civ. STAT. art. 1175 (1963). Cities may be more prone
psychologically to exercise home rule perogatives under a provision enumerating home
rule powers and functions than under one granting broad undefined home rule authority.
This observation appears substantiated by Texas and Wisconsin experience. Under a
broad legislative grant, Wisconsin cities appear hesitant to exercise home rule powers.
Hagensick, supra note 30, at 353.
140. Letter from Riley E. Fletcher, General Counsel, Texan Municipal League, to
Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, April 3, 1967.
141. See, e.g., City of Sweetwater v. Geron, 380 S.W. 2d 550, 552 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1964).
See generally Keith, Home Rule-Texas Style, 44 NAT. MUN. REv. 181-188 (1955).
142. Home rule in Washington State is a matter of legislative grace. See supra note
88. In its reply to the author's home rule questionnaire, the Association of Washington
Cities indicated that it prefers a provision granting home rule in broad general terms
along with an enumeration of home rule powers and functions. It stated this reason
for its preference:
Legislative bodies are subject to extreme political pressures from special
interest groups with private axes to grind. The will of these groups is often
given much greater consideration because of campaign contributions, etc,
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social, economic, and technological factors can change a local function
today into a state function tomorrow-no home rule plan satisfactory
to everyone can probably ever be devised. Nevertheless, two principal
model home rule plans have been proposed, each with its advantages
and disadvantages. 143 These plans are not intended to be definitive;
rather, they are intended, as suggested by the National League of Cities,
"to provide a helpful formulation of ideas for those concerned with
home rule in the political context of any state in the Union." 144 There-
fore, any state considering writing and adopting a provision can well
profit from studying them, but any provision finally adopted should
reflect the peculiar conditions of the particular state adopting it.
The Old NML Model
The first plan, that of the National Municipal League, published in
the 1921 Model State Constitution45 and in succeeding editions of that
document through 1948, is considered by the National Municipal League
as being based on the imperio in imperium model. Under the 1948
version of this model, "each city is... granted full power and authority
to pass laws and ordinances relating to its local affairs, property and
government." The provision further states that "this grant of authority
shall not be deemed to limit or restrict the power of the legislature to
enact laws of statewide concern uniformly applicable to every city." It
than the recommendations of the duly constituted local authorities. Unless
cities are given some specific powers which the legislature cannot constantly
override, the whole concept of home rule is in shambles. The legislature, in
other words, will constantly go over the heads of local officials to appease
an interest group, hamstringing an administration, or place undue burdens
on cities without providing the funds to pay the bill.
Association of Washington Cities questionnaire reply to Kenneth E. Vanlandingham,
Oct. 5, 1965.
143. A third model plan, similar to the AMA or NLC model, has been suggested
by the U. S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. This model pro-
poses granting units of local government residual powers. In general, it would allow
them to exercise all powers not denied by general law. See U.S. ADvisoRY CoMMissIoN
ON INTERGOVERNAENTAL RELATIONS, STATE LEcISLATIVE PROGRAIMS 185-186 (1963).
144. Az IUAN MUNICIPAL AssocATIoN (National League of Cities), MODEL CON-
STITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MmNIciAL HoME RULE 5 (1953).
145. Early editions of the Model State Constitution were sometimes published as an
appendix to texts on state government. See, e.g., HoIcoMaE, STATE GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 571-588 (2d ed. 1926); MATREws, AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT 619-680
(Rev. ed. 1934). In terms of actual adoption, the old NML model has never been
widely accepted. Features of it, however, are contained in the New York and Utah
provisions. See N.Y. CoNsr. art. IX, S 2 (c); UTAH CoNsrT. art. XI, § 5. The old NML
model is also similar to the earlier Colorado provision. See COLO. CONST. art. XX.
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also enumerates powers and functions which it states "shall be deemed
a part of the powers conferred upon cities . . . when not inconsistent
with general law." Included among such enumerated powers and func-
tions are the police power, taxation and indebtedness, local publicserv-
ices, cultural facilities, local public utilities, eminent domain, and urban
redevelopment.14
This provision appears to contain ambiguities which cause some intel-
lectual difficulties. Although it grants a city "full power and authority
to pass laws and ordinances, relating its local affairs, property and
government," it enumerates as part of this grant powers and functions
which it specifies must be exercised consistent with general law. The
provision appears a paradox in that, although apparently containing an
unqualified grant of home rule authority based on the imperio in im-
perium model, it provides that a part of the grant must be exercised
consistent with general law. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to believe
that any state supreme court would hold those powers enumerated in
the provision, most of which appear either to be state in character or
to contain elements of state interest, to belong properly within the
sphere of "property, affairs and government." 147 If granted subject to
general law, however, they very properly can be included in a home
rule provision. This entire provision appears to combine features of
both imperio in imperium and legislative supremacy models. The National
Municipal League, however, apparently considers it as being based on
the imperio in imperium model and intends it to confer authority on
cities to act in the area of "local affairs, property and government,"
limited only by general laws of state-wide concern uniformly appli-
cable to all cities; and in this article it will be interpreted to have this
meaning. 48 In any event, its intended purpose is that of assuring cities
146. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION § 8.04 (5th ed. 1948).
147. For additional comment on the ambiguities of this provision, see Sandalow,
supra note 53, at 651.
148. In his explanatory article on this provision, Professor Bromage confirms this
interpretation. See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION §§ 45,
46-47 (5th ed. 1948). In a letter of Nov. 19, 1967 to the author, Professor Bromage
commented:
My interpretation of the imperio in imperium doctrine is that most consti-
tutions creating it, recognize that the state may still enact and control by
acts of statewide concern uniformly applicable to every city. I am sure
this is the proper interpretation of NML 8.04 (1948). The phrase "general
law" follows directly after another sentence which refers to "statewide
concern." I think you would be correct in saying that the 1948 model, like
other imperio doctrines, is subject to the restraint of general laws of state-
wide concern-not just any general law.
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some home rule powers beyond state legislative control; but inasmuch
as the enumerated powers and functions must be exercised consistent
with general law, cities are assured of home rule powers only to the
extent that the state judiciary "reads" them into the general grant in
"local affairs, property and government."
The NLC Model
The second principal model home rule plan, proposed by Jefferson
Fordham in a 1953 study, Model Constitutional Prozisions for Municipal
Home Rule, prepared for the National League of Cities, subjects home
rule in the substantive area entirely to legislative control. In the pro-
cedural area, i.e., in matters concerning municipal executive, legislative
and administrative structure, organization, personnel, and procedure, the
plan declares municipal action superior to state law.149 The National
League of Cities is critical of imperio in imperium provisions because
they require judicial assignment of governmental functions into state
and municipal categories, an impossible task in its judgment. Like the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, it believes that assignment of such func-
tions should be made by the legislature, because it involves considerations
of public policy.1r°
In the sixth edition of its Model State Constitution, published in 1963,
though retaining as an alternative plan a modified version of its old
home rule plan, the National Municipal League, by adopting as its
preferred plan a plan very similar to those of the National League of
Cities, has accepted in principle the thinking of the National League
of Cities.' 51 One of the major differences between the home rule plans
of these two national organizations lies in the degree of home rule
granted: the new NML model subjects home rule in both its procedural
and substantive aspects to legislative control, while the NLC model
grants virtually complete home rule in the procedural area.
THE OLD NML MODEL CONSIDERED
Although concurring in part with the National League of Cities'
criticism of the old NML model, the author would question it further
because it contains important provisions borrowed from existing con-
stitutional provisions which, from the viewpoint of students of home
149. MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR Horv RuLE supra note 144, at § 6.
150. Id. at 20-21.
151. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTrruToN § 8.02 (6th ed. 1963).
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rule, have received unfavorable judicial interpretation. Such interpre-
tation is highly significant, inasmuch as state supreme courts constru-
ing borrowed constitutional provisions usually accord them the same
meaning as courts in states from which they are borrowed.152 Indeed,
authors of the recent Kansas provision, based in large measure on the
Wisconsin provision, evidently gave careful study and consideration
to Wisconsin judicial construction of the Wisconsin provision.'53 In
this article, moreover, the author feels obligated to consider the old
NML model provision as interpreted by the highest courts of New
York and Wisconsin, states from whose constitutions it is largely
borrowed.
The phrasing of the home rule grant of the old NML model, "local
affairs, property and government," is borrowed from the New York
Constitution's phrase, "property, affairs or government." 154 The New
York phrase, originating in an 1894 New York constitutional amend-
ment, 5 ' and now copied or paraphrased in the constitutions of several
states, already had been narrowly construed prior to its incorporation
into the 1923 New York home rule amendment.' 56 This phrase, accord-
ing to the New York Court of Appeals, had become "words of art,"
and had restricted significance. When placed in the New York home
rule amendment, it had a "court of appeals definition, not that of Web-
ster's Dictionary." 157 In numerous cases, the New York court has
held what some might consider proper home rule powers and functions
not to be included within the phrase. 58 If this court's interpretation of
the New York Constitution's phrase is considered as the meaning of the
Model Constitution's home rule phrase, "local affairs, property and gov-
ernment," then the Model's home rule grant is not very broad.
The Model State Constitution's statement following its general home
rule grant that the grant "shall not be deemed to limit or restrict the
power of the legislature to enact laws of state-wide concern uniformly
applicable to every city" is borrowed from the Wisconsin constitutional
152. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 181 A. 2d 215 (Del. 1962); Jaramillo v. City
of Albuquerque, 64 N.M. 427, 329 P. 2d 626 (1958).
153. Letter from E. A. Mosher, Executive Director, League of Kansas Municipalities,
to Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, May 31, 1967. See also DRURY, HoME RULE IN KANSAS
48-51 (Univ. of Kan. Publications, Govt. Research Series No. 31, 1965).
154. N.Y. CoNsT. art. IX, § 26(2) (Supp. 1967).
155. N.Y. CONs-r. art. XII, § 2 (1894).
156. See Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N.Y. 110, 99 N.E. 241 (1912).
157. Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705, 707 (1929).
158. See supra note 123.
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provision which empowers cities and villages to determine their local
affairs and government ".... subject only to... such enactments of the
legislature of state-wide concern as shall with uniformity affect every
city or every village." '1 This latter provision has been interpreted by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court to have a meaning probably never in-
tended by its authors. Read literally, it appears like the old NML model
to confer on cities authority to determine their local affairs and govern-
ment, while at the same time to restrict the legislature to enactments of
state-wide concern uniformly applicable to all cities. As already noted,
however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held determination of local
affairs to be a matter primarily for the legislature.' In addition, em-
phasizing that the home rule amendment was intended to apply only to
local affairs, the court has held that in matters of state-wide concern, the
state legislature may classify cities for purposes of state legislation. To
hold otherwise, according to its reasoning, would impair the right of
the legislature to control state government. 6' What the Wisconsin pro-
vision really means, according to the court, is that when the state legis-
lature enacts local legislation, not applicable uniformly to all cities,
a city may, through enactment of a charter ordinance, exempt itself
from such legislation. This provision, as interpreted by the Wisconsin
court, permits the state legislature to prohibit exercise of home rule
powers provided it acts through uniform enactments applicable to all
cities.162
This interpretation is not evident from the language of the provision;
and any state adopting a provision based on that portion of the old
NML model derived from the Wisconsin provision should be aware
of this fact. Although another state supreme court might arrive at a
different interpretation of the Wisconsin provision, it normally would
note the Wisconsin interpretation and would likely accord that interpre-
tation great weight. Whether it is good public policy to require a state
legislature, when dealing with matters of state-wide concern, to act only
by general law applicable to all cities may be debatable. Occasionally,
peculiar circumstances may justify classification. In any event, a state
adopting a provision based on the old NML model and desiring that
the state legislature act in state-wide matters only by uniform law
applicable to all cities should add an additional statement prohibiting
159. Wis. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
160. See p. 292 & notes 119-122 supra.
161. Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 25, 29-30 (1936).
162. Id. 267 N.V. at 35-36.
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classification of cities for purposes of enacting legislation state in
character.
The Kansas Amendment
In 1960, Kansas adopted a somewhat unique home rule provision, yet
to receive major judicial interpretation, borrowed largely from the
Wisconsin provision and from the home rule plan of the National
League of Cities. 6 3 This provision, like that of Wisconsin, empowers
cities to determine their "local affairs and government" subject to state
legislative enactments uniformly applicable to all cities. But being aware
of the judicial interpretation of the Wisconsin provision and the pitfalls
involved in judicial determination of home rule powers, its authors pro-
vided that, save for matters of municipal incorporation, establishment
of municipal territorial boundaries, and taxation, cities may exempt
themselves from state legislative enactments, state or local, not applicable
uniformly to all cities. This provision accomplishes what the authors
of the Wisconsin provision apparently intended by requiring the state
legislature to act by uniform law applicable to all cities in the area of
state affairs, but at the price of depriving the state legislature of its
unrestricted right to conduct state government through classifying
cities.
Inasmuch as Kansas cities may perform such functions as are not
forbidden by uniform law applicable to all cities, judicial determination
of what constitutes local affairs and government and what constitutes
state affairs appears to have become unnecessary. The criterion for
determining the legality of local action in either local or state affairs
is whether the state legislature has already acted by uniform law appli-
cable to every city. If the state has so acted, local action is thereby
precluded. Evidently, the home rule provision's sole purpose in authoriz-
ing cities to determine their local affairs and government is to enable
them to initiate legislation on matters which they conceive to be within
the sphere of local affairs and government. Restrictions on local action
will have to come from the state legislature. It seems a paradox that
under a provision intended primarily for home rule, unless forbidden
by uniform law applicable to all cities, cities may initiate legislation on
state matters." 4 Although the Kansas provision may represent a na-
163. KAN. CoNsr. art. XII, § 5. See also DRURY, HOME RULE IN KANSAS (Univ. of
Kan. Publications, Govt. Research Series No. 31, 1965).
164. Under some imperio, in imperium .provisions, municipalities have been per-
mitred to act on state matters until forbidden by state law. See, e.g., Barrett, v.. State,
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tional trend in current home rule thought, particularly as embodied in
recent model home rule plans, it has its pitfalls, particularly where the
state legislature neglects to place appropriate prohibitions on local action
in matters usually considered state matters. 16 5
Enumeration of Powers and Functions
The old NML model's enumeration of home rule powers and func-
dons which must be exercised consistent with general law may be
dubious in principle, inasmuch as the "consistency requirement" can
result in complete legislative denial of any powers granted. But, as noted
earlier, most of the enumerated powers are either inherently state
powers or contain elements of state interest, and consequently cannot
be delegated unless subject to control by superior state law. Neverthe-
less, in any instance where the legislature has authority to deny or to
interfere with exercise of home rule prerogatives, the temptation is
always present for it to do so. For example, although the Alaska Con-
stitution authorizes home rule cities to "exercise all legislative powers
not prohibited by law or by charter," the Alaska legislature has enacted
a statute requiring charter provisions not to conflict with the laws of
the state.' 66 Further, the New York home rule amendment directs
the state legislature to enact a "statute of local governments" granting
municipalities additional powers in areas other than "property, affairs-
or government," such powers to be repealed only by specific legislation
enacted in two consecutive sessions.'", But some belief exists that the
New York legislature has reserved to itself authority to repeal, at any
time, all powers granted. Further, the statute does not grant any, sig-'
nificant powers not already existing in either the state constitution or
statutes. s'6 8
In the ideal sense, home rule powers should not depend upon l6gis-
44 Ariz. 270, 36 P. 2d 260 (1934). On the other hand, it has been judicially held. that
home rule municipalities lack authority tO act on state matters. See Green v. City of
Amarillo, 244 S.W. 241 (Texas Civ. App. 1922); Madison v. Tolzman, 7 Wis. 2d 570,
97 N.W. 2d 513 (1959). These decisions, however, are isolated and thus 'do not
represent the trend in judicial thinking of Wisconsin and Texas courts.
165. For consideration of this problem which arises from provisions based on the
NLC and new NML models, see p. 310 infra, The NLC and New NML Models Con-
sidered: The State-Municipal Dicbotozy.
166. ArLsKA CONsr..art. X, § 11; ALAsKA STAT. S 29.40.010 (1962).
167. N.Y. CoNsr. art. IX, § 2b(1) (Supp. 1967).
168. See Note, Hone Rule and the New. York Constitution, 66 'CoLum. 'L. Riv.
1144, 1152-1153 (1966).
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lative or judicial whim, but should be granted directly by the constitu-
tion. Although, in view of the fact that it involves largely state matters,
the particular enumeration of powers and functions to be exercised
consistent with general law made in the old NML model seems proper,
enumeration of other specific powers and functions for exclusive mu-
nicipal exercise also seems desirable. Writing in 1953, Schmandt observed:
"Since experience has shown that it is undesirable to leave matters of
policy as to state-city relations completely in the hands of the legisla-
ture, the determination should be made with as much exactness as pos-
sible by terms of the fundamental law itself." 169
Whether strictly home rule powers and functions ever can be enu-
merated adequately in a constitutional provision is a question crucial to
the future of home rule. Although proponents of the model home rule
plan of the National League of Cities evidently believe they cannot be,
the fact remains that the Colorado Constitution does enumerate some
such powers and functions, including the municipal court system, which,
by express constitutional language, are declared superior to state law.'
As noted earlier, state and municipal governments possess a concurrent
interest in most governmental functions, and Mendelson has suggested
that home rule provisions should recognize this concurrent interest.' 7'
The recent draft New York Constitution, defeated in referendum vote
November 7, 1967, did recognize this concurrent interest by empower-
ing every local government to enact local laws not inconsistent with
general laws relating to local aspects of matters of state concern." 2
Suggested Changes
Assuming that home rule represents good public policy, to prevent
judicial and legislative erosion of home rule powers, and to enlarge the
home-rule sphere, a provision should: (a) enumerate some home rule
powers and functions, and (b), subject to the undoubted right of the
state to conduct and control its government, grant municipalities au-
thority to exercise those powers and functions in which they possess
a concurrent interest with state government.
Since it is generally agreed that allocation of state-municipal powers
169. Schmandt, supra note 87, at 410.
170. CoLo. CoNsT. art. XX, § 6.
171. Mendelson, Patis to Constitutional Home Rule for Municipalities, 6 VAND. L.
REv. 66, 69-70 (1952).




and functions is a political task, draftsmen of home rule provisions might
attempt to designate some specific home rule powers and functions.
Any attempt to enumerate should, of course, recognize that some mat-
ters, such as incorporation of cities, establishment of municipal terri-
torial boundaries, and definition of crimes, should be assigned exclusively
to state government. Moreover, the draftsmen should not designate as
exclusively municipal any power or function which in the future may
become state. But any enumeration whose local exercise would not
unduly impair the conduct of state government seems both desirable
and proper. In the numerous areas of concurrent municipal and state
concern, some method should be devised which will allow municipal
activity, provided it does not interfere with state interest. For example,
municipalities could be empowered to act in areas or on subjects where
the state legislature has acted, subject to a legislative veto by more than
a mere majority vote, the veto to be exercised within a particular period
of the next legislative session.
171
Considered generally, the old NML model, though instructive to
draftsmen of home rule provisions, should be viewed with some skep-
ticism. This observation should not be construed as an entire condem-
nation of the model but rather as suggesting that it needs strengthening
in areas where it now appears defective. Fully realizing the difficult
problems involved, the author does believe that much can be gained
from the standpoint of home rule by adoption of provisions which
enumerate at least some home rule powers and functions and which
authorize municipal activity in the sphere of concurrent state and
municipal interest.
MODEL HOME RULE PLANS BASED ON LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY
Basic Differences Between NLC and New NML Models
Based on the assumption that in a dynamic society home rule powers
are largely incapable of precise constitutional or judicial definition, both
the National League of Cities and the National Municipal League have
now adopted model provisions which subject home rule to legislative
control. These model plans are very similar in principle, the new NML
model apparently being borrowed from the model adopted ten years
earlier by the National League of Cities; however, they do contain
173. Precedent for state legislative approval of local home rule action already
exists under Delaware and Vermont legislative home rule provisions. See p. 276 & notes
49 and 50 supra.
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some important differences. First, since the NLC model in imperio in
imperium fashion places the procedural area of home rule, i.e., the area
concerned with administrative organization and related matters, entirely
under municipal control, the scope of state legislative authority over
home rule is broader under the new NML model. This latter model
provides: "A county or city may exercise any legislative power or
perform any function which is not denied to it by its charter, is not
denied to counties or cities generally, or to counties or cities of its
class, and is within such limitations as the legislature may establish by
general law." 174
In its grant of substantive powers, the NLC model employs some-
what more involved language than the new NML model. The meaning
of this language is not altogether clear. In addition to granting a home
rule municipal corporation all powers granted 'a general law city of
its particular class, save as limited by its charter, the NLC model
provides:
A municipal corporation which adopts a home rule charter may
exercise any power or perform any function which the legislature
has power to devolve upon a non-home rule charter municipal
corporation and which is not denied to that municipal corporation
by its home rule charter, is not denied to all home rule charter
municipal corporations by statute and is within such limitations as
may be established by statute.175
Second, these models provide different methods for classifying cities
174. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION § 8.02 (6th ed. 1963).
This edition of the MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION confers home rule on counties and
cities in the same section. County home rule, which is not considered in this article,
is constitutionally authorized for all or some counties in California, Maryland, Ohio,
Texas, Missouri, Louisiana (parishes), Washington, Florida, Minnesota, New York,
Oregon, Michigan, Alaska (boroughs), and Hawaii. But in terms of actual adoptions,
compared with municipal home rule, it has made very little headway in this country.
California, with ten home rule counties, leads in the number of adoptions. Concerning
county home rule generally, see DUNCOMBE, COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 242-246
(1966); SNIDER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN RURAL AMERICA 104-113 (1957).
175. AMERICAN MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION (National League of Cities), MODEL Cosnr-
TUTIONAL PROVISION FOR MUNICIPAL HomE RULE, § 6 (1953). Although several states
have recently adopted provisions embodying the idea of legislative control of home
rule expressed in this provision, only two, North Dakota and South Dakota, have
adopted provisions borrowing its phraseology. The North Dakota amendment, more-




for purposes of enacting legislation applicable to them. The new NML
model, along with forbidding enactment of special or local legislation,
provides that cities may be classified by general law into as many civil
divisions as necessary on the basis of population, or on any other rea-
sonable basis. 176 But the NLC model, along with stipulating that the
legislature may act in relation to a municipal corporation only by laws
which are general in terms and effect-an indirect prohibition of special
and local legislation-provides that municipal corporations may be
grouped into not more than four classes based on population, with not
less than two cities in each class. 177
Since it would seem to lend itself less to state legislative abuse, the
NLC classification plan appears much preferable to that of the new
NML plan. Under the latter, certain legislative abuses can occur: (1)
any number of classes of cities can be created which could result in
special legislation disguised as classification; and (2) inasmuch as the
phrase "on any other reasonable basis" involves exercise of value judg-
ment, some undesirable classification scheme, provided it wins judicial
sanction, can be established.7  Because it places the procedural area
of home rule largely beyond state legislative control and because its
classification plan appears to guard the more populous cities against state
legislative discrimination, the NLC model appears generally preferable
to the new NML model. But in the substantative area both models
make home rule a matter of legislative grace, i.e., they grant no home
rule beyond legislative retraction, and, as experience demonstrates, the
state legislature is sometimes an untrustworthy guardian of home rule
powers.
Both the new NML and NLC models appear unique in home rule
thought in reversing Dillon's rule by enabling cities to exercise all
powers and perform all functions not denied by state legislation. Under
Dillon's rule, cities can ordinarily exercise only those powers granted
176. §§ 4.11, 8.01(1).
177. §§ 1, 3.
178. The IKEN(rcKY CONSTITUTION (S 156) establishes six classes of cities with spe-
cific population limits, and provides that, in classifying cities, the state legislature "in
the absence of other satisfactory information . . . shall be governed by the last
preceding federal census." In view of this constitutional language, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals, the state's highest court, refuses to take judicial recognition when the
legislature assigns a city to a class not warranted by its actual population. See Grifin
v. Powell, 143 Ky. 276, 136 S.W. 626 (1911). Presently, based on 1960 U.S. Census
figures, some seventy cities are apparently improperly classified. See Ky. LEGIs. RESEARCH
COlMM'N, KENTUCKY LAW AND THE CITIES 1 (June, 1966).
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by the legislature. From the viewpoint of home rule, this provision of
these models represents a significant advance, since municipalities need
only to lobby to prevent enactment of inimical legislation in order to
protect home rule prerogatives. Further, since they permit a home
rule city to exercise all powers not forbidden by charter or by state
law, the charter serves only as an instrument to limit municipal action.
In contrast to a charter which is considered a grant of power, wherein
municipal powers and functions must be stated in great detail,"79 a
charter of this character should not only be less difficult to draft, but
also should broaden the sphere of home rule authority. Since there
has been very little case law interpreting provisions based on these
models, it is perhaps too early to conclude how successful they will
prove in practice.
THE NLC AND NEW NML MODELS CONSIDERED
Both the NLC and new NML models and provisions based on them
reflect not only a sense of failure in provisions based on the imperio in
imperium model, but also represent an acceptance or acquiescence in
judicial rulings of state interest in home rule cases. They appear to
offer, at least in theory, a much wider area for exercise of municipal
home rule initiative than do imperio in imperium provisions, such as
those of New York and Rhode Island, and numerous other states, where
the substantive grant of home rule has been narrowly contracted through
adverse judicial rulings.
The State Legislature and Home Rule
Whether these models will provide a long-run satisfactory solution
for resolving the problem of conferring substantive home rule remains
unanswered. Certain serious questions, however, can be raised. First,
like several other existing home rule provisions, they make home rule
a matter of state legislative grace, and home rule of this character, some
believe, is not truly home rule, at least in its historic sense. In general,
home rule under this type of provision has enjoyed only mixed suc-
cess, having-succeeded only where there has been present a favorable
legislative climate. But it is possible that a home rule provision based
on legislative supremacy, particularly when coupled with a plan for
classifying cities similar to that suggested by the NLC model, can prove
satisfactory, especially with a state legislature where urban populations
179. Cf. ADRIAN & PRESS, supra note 6, at 172.
[Vol. 10:269
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE
are properly represented. In Texas, where home rule is generally con-
sidered successful, for state legislative purposes home rule cities are
treated as a group. The constitutions of several recent home rule states,
such as Maryland and Kansas, require that before home rule ordinances
may be negated, state legislation applicable to all cities must be enacted.
Provisions such as these possess two advantages: (1) since it must con-
sider on a state-wide basis the consequences of its action, the state
legislature may hesitate to enact unwise or ill-considered legislation;
and (2) in the event it attempts to enact such legislation, resistance from
all cities should suffice to thwart the legislative will.
Since the reapportionment decision in Baker v. Carr80 and the deci-
sions in subsequent cases growing out of that decision, cities are in a
better position to defend their home rule interests because they are
more properly represented in the state legislature. Writing prior to
Baker v. Carr, Professor Bromage, an advocate of the old NML model
stated:
One might be willing to give more acceptance to the AMA
(NLC) model if there were greater assurance over-all, of the re-
apportionment of state legislatures in the direction of greater urban
representation. A state legislature representing urban populations
more accurately might be intrusted with the kind of life or death
discretion over a home rule power, delineated in the AMA (NLC)
Model.1'8
Now it may plausibly be argued that if cities acting through their
state municipal leagues do not lobby effectively to protect their inter-
ests, they deserve whatever state legislative treatment they receive. Still,
this may be a questionable argument since urban representatives in at
least some state legislatures sometimes do not vote in unison. Further,
a large proportion of the urban population is newly arrived and, con-
sequently, may be inarticulate in expressing the urban viewpoint. In
any event, because of their increasing representation in the state legis-
lature, cities at least appear to be in a better position to advance their
own interests. Moreover, in instances where all cities are classified into
a single group for legislative purposes or in instances where a state's most
populous city is included along with several others in a single class, the
likelihood of state legislative discrimination against the most populous
180. 369 US. 186 (1962).
181. Bromage, Hoze Rule-NML Model, 44 NAT. MuN. REv. 132, 135 (1955).
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city is lessened. The fact remains, however, that in states whose con-
stitutions subject home rule to legislative control, cities must lobby to
protect and advance their interests, and a favorable home rule climate
must exist.
The State-Municipal Dichotomy
Another perhaps equally serious objection to the NLC and new NML
models is that they do not face at all the fundamental question, raised
years ago by Frank G. Goodnow, concerning what should constitute
the proper sphere of municipal autonomy, but rather by leaving the
question for legislative determination, they merely lay it aside.182 There
is strong reason for believing that this question, which has plagued home
rule since its inception, will inevitably recur under provisions based on
these plans.1 3
The evident purpose of all home rule provisions, explicitly stated in
some and strongly implied in others, is to enable municipalities to legis-
late in the area of municipal affairs, not state affairs. Yet, under pro-
visions based on model plans emphasizing legislative supremacy, cities
can exercise state powers in the absence of legislative prohibitions. As
an illustration of the problem which can occur with provisions of this
kind, when the city of Newport attempted to license certain businesses
under guise of exercising the police power, a power inherent in state
government, the Rhode Island Supreme Court not only ruled that the
police power was not included within the home rule grant to enact
local laws relating to "property, affairs and government," but it also
called attention to the fact that the Rhode Island home rule provision
expressly states that its intent is to confer the right of self-government
only in all local matters.18 4
The Alaska Local Affairs Agency has noted that, in Alaska, whose
constitution empowers cities to exercise all legislative powers not pro-
hibited by law or charter, "[s]tatutes covering divorce, consumer pro-
tection, civil rights, criminal and civil procedure, licensing, intra-state
transportation, and so forth are all supposed to apply uniformly through-
out the state. Yet, few (if any) legislative prohibitions are attached to
182. GOODNOW, supra note 2, at 9-10. See also CHICAGO HOME RULE Comm' supra
note 2, at 222.
183. Cf. Rusco, supra note 2, at 47; SANDALOW, supra note 53, at 687-691.
184. R.I. CONST. amend. 28, § 1; Newport Amusement Co. v. Maher, 92 R.I. 51.
166 A. 2d 216 (1960). See also p. -- & note 164 supra.
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these statutes to prevent home rule powers being exercised in conflict
with them." 'S5
In the Alaskan situation, the state legislature should enact legislation
to provide appropriate prohibitions,8 6 but in the event the legislature
neglects to act and in the event the courts should refuse to intervene on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, near chaos could result. The Alaska
Agency believes, however, that in the absence of state legislative action
"the courts will be hard pressed not to adopt a rule of conflict or incon-
sistency or, at least, of implied prohibition of home rule powers." 187
It suggests that the courts perhaps can find the answer to the problem
by returning to the concept of local government itself. Although the
Alaska Constitution does give cities all legislative powers, it does not
make each city a state legislature. Rather, the power conferred on each
city is for carrying out its own purposes. The courts, according to this
reasoning, can inquire whether municipal exercise of a particular power
is pertinent to the function a city is intended to serve.1 88
Although the Alaska Agency states that judicial determination of
pertinence does not involve application of a test of state versus local
function, it would seem at least to require a test closely approximating
it. Thus it appears quite likely that provisions of this type may even-
tually, like earlier and more traditional provisions, throw home rule
into the judicial arena, a situation which its authors have sought to
avoid. Much legislative wisdom and diligence will be required for these
provisions to be entirely successful. Not only must the state legislature
itself refrain from enacting measures violating home rule principles, but
it also must enact appropriate legislation to guard against local en-
185. Office of the [Alaska] Governor, Home Rule in Alaska, 2 ALAsKcA LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT 1.4 (1962).
186. The home rule provision of the draft NEw Youc CoNsTiTrioN, defeated in
referendum vote November 7, 1967, which was based on the NLC and new NML
models, contained a safeguard against local encroachment on state legislative authority.
It provided that the home rule authority which it delegated should become effective,
and should remain in effect, only while there existed a state statute of restrictions
limiting exercise of home rule powers. See art. XI, § 2(b). The U. S. Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations also recognizes the necessity for placing limi-
tations on local initiative under provisions based on the NLC and new NML models.
It suggests that "delegation of residual powers should be preceded by careful review of
affirmative limitations upon the powers of local government within a state." U.S.
ADvIsORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNIMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATuTORY RESTRICTIONS UPON THE STRUCTURAL, FUNCTIONAL, AND PERSONNEL POWERS
OF LocAL GOVERNMENT 73 (Oct., 1962).
187. Home Rule in Alaska, supra note 185.
188. Id.
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croachment on state prerogatives. Since this model was formally pro-
posed only in 1953, more time must elapse before it can be fully
evaluated.
THE FUTURE OF HOME RULE
Constitutional home rule has now existed in the United States for
almost a century and is presently authorized in thirty-three states, al-
though in some states it has in practice made little or no headway.
While its quality and degree of success in any particular states is difficult
to assess, it appears most successful in Michigan, California, Texas, Ore-
gon, and Ohio. Since the end of World War II, it has been authorized
by fifteen states, including the new states of Hawaii and Alaska, but it
appears too early to evaluate it in these states. If judged merely by
adoption of provisions and by degree of present home rule activity,
sentiment favorable to home rule appears weakest in some special legis-
lation states of the South and in the sparsely populated states of the
Rocky Mountain region. Except for New Jersey, where legislative
home rule appears successfully practiced, Illinois remains the most
populous urban non-constitutional home rule state.
Inasmuch as several states are currently in the process of constitutional
revision and other states may follow suit, considerable thought and
attention within the near future may be focused upon adoption or
amendment of home rule provisions. Progress in adoption and amend-
ment of provisions, however, will not likely be uniform. Because of fear
of worsening their current home rule situation, some states, such as
Ohio, whose provisions have received extensive judicial treatment, may
hesitate to amend them, even for improvement, and little desire for
home rule will likely be manifested by states wherein the practice of
special legislation remains firmly entrenched. The General Counsel of
the North Carolina League of Municipalities said:
There has been no agitation for so called "home rule" in North
Carolina; perhaps this is for the reason that, historically, municipali-
ties have been able to secure the types of authority they desired
by local charter acts, generally. With extremely rare exceptions,
any local act desired by a member of our General Assembly for his
county or a municipality in his county is enacted without hesita-
tion (and naturally, without adequate consideration). So long as
this situation obtains, I do not believe that the towns and cities of
North Carolina will want to trade it for any "home rule" constitu-
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tional or statutory provisions which would of necessity become
the subject of numerous technical law suits .... 189
On the basis of past experience, it is possible to foresee, at least with
some degree of accuracy, the future course of home rule. Apparently
the revived interest in it which arose following World War II has not
wholly abated, and more home rule activity in the way of adoption
of new or amended provisions may be expected. Home rule provisions
of the future, like those of the recent past, will likely be based on the
NLC and new NML models which, except for precedural matters
under the NLC model, emphasize legislative supremacy. Existing pro-
visions based on the imperio in imperium model, such as that contained
in the old NML model, though not likely to disappear wholly, will
rarely be adopted in the future.190 Provisions based on legislative su-
premacy models, currently popular, have yet to prove themselves
wholly satisfactory in practice; and experience, which only time can
provide, may yet substantiate the arguments of their critics.' 9'
The principal problem involving home rule, which remains unresolved,
is that of determining or defining its proper province. Since state and
municipal governments possess a concurrent interest in most govern-
mental functions, these functions cannot be divided into separate and
distinct categories except on the basis of arbitrary reasoning. Future
provisions may allow municipal exercise, subject to a state legislative
veto, of powers and functions in these areas of concurrent interest. And
although, apart from the procedural area of home rule, it is very difficult
to define powers and functions which home rule cities should be allowed
to exercise exclusively, at least some attempt should be made in this
direction. But no power or function should be designated as exclusively
municipal if its character is likely to change.
Recently adopted provisions reveal important trends in current home
rule thought, which, while not altogether new, is becoming more
pronounced. Particularly significant is the fact that some of these
189. Questionnaire reply by Ernest H. Ball, General Counsel, N.C. League of
Municipalities, to Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Fall, 1965.
190. This statement should not be interpreted to imply that imperio in imperium
provisions have altogether failed; they have apparently succeeded in California, Oregon,
and Ohio. But they belong largely to the home rule era ending 1912, and are not likely
to be adopted in the future.
191. These arguments are: (1) they leave undefined the proper sphere of home
rule; and (2) they make home rule a matter of legislative grace. See p. 308 supra,
The NLC and New Models Considered.
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provisions, such as those of Kansas and Massachusetts, empower cities
to exercise home rule powers in the absence of charter adoption. In
the past, charter adoption procedure prescribed by the state constitution
has frequently been a long-drawn-out and time-consuming process,
hedged in by cumbersome and unreasonable restrictions, and conse-
quently some cities apparently have not adopted charters. If granted
authority to exercise home rule powers directly, cities will be more
likely to exercise them. Moreover, even where charter adoption is ab-
solutely required, there appears to be a developing tendency to provide
that a city charter shall constitute a limitation rather than a grant of
power. When a charter is legally constituted a grant of power, in order
to comply with Dillon's Rule, municipal powers and functions must
be stated in minute detail; hence, long charters. A charter which is
legally considered a limitation of power, such as Alaska's, is much less
difficult to draft, inasmuch as it must state only prohibited powers and
functions. Further, constitutional efforts have been made, and will con-
tinue to be made, to prevent arbitrary state legislative treatment of the
more populous cities. Classification provisions based on the NLC model,
some versions of which have already been adopted, should prove effec-
tive in accomplishing this aim in most instances.
The population of most urban areas, particularly those of the great
cities and their suburbs, will continue to grow, and some may contend
that increasing state interest engendered in the affairs of cities by this
increasing population will thereby decrease opportunity for home rule.
But, if the myriad units of governments stituated within many metro-
politan regions can ever be integrated under a single unit of government,
this unit conceivably could be vested with vast home rule powers. Fi-
nally, better representation of cities in the state legislature, apparently
assured by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr,
should result in more sympathetic and understanding legislative treat-
ment. But home rule begins at home; no constitutional provision alone
can assure it. If home rule is to become more meaningful, cities must
not only become more aggressive in exercising it, but they must remain
on the alert through their state municipal leagues to advance and protect
their proper interests.
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